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ARTICLE

CAN ISLAMIZING A LEGAL SYSTEM
EVER HELP PROMOTE
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY?:
A VIEW FROM PAKISTAN
CLARK B. LOMBARDI*

I.

INTRODUCTION1

Over the past twenty-five years, academics have written a great deal
about the relationship between Islam and democracy and between Islam and
human rights. In the course of the scholarly discourse, debate has emerged
as to whether the thickly liberal rule of law can survive in a society where
the legal system is undergoing Islamization. Commentators can generally
be divided into pessimists and cautious optimists. Pessimists suggest that,
regrettably, Islamic values are essentially incompatible with the thickly liberal rule of law.2 The cautious optimists disagree.3 Cautious optimists argue
* Associate Professor of Law, Adjunct Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Washington. The author dedicates this article to the memory of his mother, Rosemarie
Benner Lombardi, 1936–2009, relentlessly enthusiastic, supportive, and ever willing to think
“outside the box.”
1. The research for this article grows out of an earlier research project whose findings were
published in Clark B. Lombardi, Islamism as a Response to Emergency Rule in Pakistan: The
Surprising Proposal of Justice A.R. Cornelius, in EMERGENCY POWERS IN ASIA: EXPLORING THE
LIMITS OF LEGALITY 436, 436–65 (Victor V. Ramraj & Arun K. Thiruvengadam eds., 2009).
Some of the passages in Section II of this article appeared first in that piece. The author thanks
Cambridge University Press for permission to republish those passages and both the Carnegie
Corporation of New York’s Carnegie Scholar’s Program and the University of Washington for
support while doing new research. The opinions expressed herein are entirely the author’s own
and not those of these organizations. The author thanks also John Bowen, Michael Feener, Ellis
Goldberg, Jonathan Kang, Tayyab Mahmud, Feisal Naqvi, Victor Ramraj, and Arun
Thiruvengadam for valuable comments as well as the staff of the University of St. Thomas Law
Journal for thoughtful editing. All errors that remain are the author’s.
2. See, e.g., BERNARD LEWIS, WHAT WENT WRONG?: THE CLASH BETWEEN ISLAM AND
MODERNITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST (Harper Perennial ed., HarperCollins 2003) (2002); Samuel P.
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 22–49 (1993). But see, e.g., Daniel
Pipes, Distinguishing Between Islam and Islamism, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC INT’L STUD. (1998),
available at http://www.danielpipes.org/954/distinguishing-between-islam-and-islamism. For an
analysis of this type of literature, including discussions of other works, see Frédéric Volpi, Politi-
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that the pessimists tend to define “Islam” in reductive terms—ones which
correspond to the views of some Islamists, but certainly not all. Muslims
embrace differentiated views of Islamic law, and some Islamists seem to
see Islam as largely consistent with the liberal rule of law. If Islamization is
led by this type of Islamist, the cautious optimists argue, it can be consistent
with the rule of law. I have myself argued in favor of the cautiously-optimistic position, basing my position on the experience of Egypt. In that nation, the legal system underwent a process of constitutional “Islamization,”
and to date, this development has not caused the liberal rule of law to diminish to any appreciable degree.4
A few optimists have suggested that a stronger claim might possibly be
made: that under some circumstances, Islamization can actually help
strengthen the thickly liberal rule of law.5 In this article, I will discuss an
unlikely and particularly interesting proponent of this position. I will then
describe the circumstances under which this thinker believed Islamization
would have a liberalizing effect and will consider whether there is any evidence to support his position.
The thinker at issue is the eminent Catholic Pakistani judge A. R. Cornelius, who served on Pakistan’s Supreme Court during that country’s postindependence slide into authoritarianism and who died in 1991.6 Once
skeptical about arguments that Pakistan’s law should be self-consciously
measured against Islamic norms, Cornelius lived through the establishment
of secular military dictatorship. As I will explain, he came to believe that
cal Islam in the Mediterranean: The View from Democratization Studies, 16 DEMOCRATIZATION
20, 22–24 (2009).
3. See, e.g., Nathan J. Brown et al., Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the
Arab World: Exploring Gray Zones (Middle East Series No. 67, Carnegie Endowment for Int’l
Peace & Herbet-Quandt-Siftung 2006); Mark Tessler, Islam and Democracy in the Middle East:
The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes Toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries, 34
COMP. POL. 337, 337–54 (2002). For commentary on this type of work and an identification of
multiple, quite distinct strains within it, see Volpi, supra note 2, at 25–31.
4. As I have shown, the Egyptian legal system underwent a process of constitutional “Islamization” during the 1970s and ’80s, and to date, this development has not caused the liberal
rule of law to diminish to any appreciable degree. See CLARK B. LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS
“ISLAMIC” LAW IN MODERN EGYPT: THE INCORPORATION OF THE SHARI’A INTO EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Stud. in Islamic L. & Soc. Ser. No. 19, Brill Acad. Pub. 2006); Clark B. Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Do Constitutions Requiring Adherence to Shari’a Threaten Human
Rights? How Egypt’s Constitutional Court Reconciles Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law,
21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV., 379, 379–435 (2006).
5. See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 125 (2008) (noting
the presence of optimists about the role of Islam who believe that “it has taken the Islamists . . . to
get beyond the state-centered form of governance associated with corrupt executivism”); id. at
148–49 (suggesting that Islamism, “both as an actual set of historical practices and as a contemporary ideology, can provide the necessary resources” for the establishment of the rule of law in
countries that have, in the modern era, been relentlessly autocratic).
6. For biographical information about Cornelius, see RALPH BRAIBANTI, JUSTICE CORNELIUS
OF PAKISTAN: AN ANALYSIS WITH LETTERS AND SPEECHES 1–66 (1999); S.M. Haider, Preface to
A.R. CORNELIUS, LAW AND JUDICIARY IN PAKISTAN 1–45 (S. M. Haider ed., 1981).
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Islamization might be a necessary precondition for the reestablishment of
the liberal rule of law in Pakistan.
In Part II, I give a brief biography of Cornelius. As I note, he is the
most unlikely champion of Islamization that one could hope to find. Cornelius was a life-long Christian and zealous champion of liberal constitutionalism. A Cambridge-educated member of both colonial India and Pakistan’s
legal elite, Cornelius was appointed to the Supreme Court during a period in
which the executive was beginning to aggrandize its powers at the expense
of the legislature and, eventually, the judiciary. This process would lead
eventually to the abolition of Pakistan’s constitution and the installation of
an authoritarian military regime. In a series of famous dissents and
speeches, Cornelius resisted this trend. He consistently argued for the merits of liberal common law constitutional theory and, in particular, for the
position that governments can never legitimately violate fundamental
rights.7
In Part III, I discuss some trends that led the Catholic judicial liberal
Cornelius to believe that Islamization, or at least a certain type of Islamization, might be a useful, even necessary, step toward re-establishing the rule
of law in Pakistan.
In Part IV, I will analyze a number of speeches and articles that Cornelius wrote between 1960 and his death in 1991. In them, Cornelius argued
that the only hope for re-empowering the Pakistani judiciary and, ultimately, for re-establishing the liberal rule of law was to be found in a process by which the judiciary and bar systematically made an “Islamic”
argument for liberal democracy.
As I discuss in Part V, Cornelius’s writings about Islam have, at least
in recent decades, received little serious scholarly attention either in Pakistan or in the United States.8 No one has systematically asked whether the
history of Pakistan or of other countries supports his hypothesis that in a
country like Pakistan, the best hope for establishing a liberal judicial check
7. Cornelius was particularly famous, both in Pakistan and internationally, for a series of
judicial dissents in the 1950s protesting the majority’s decision to approve expansive claims to
executive power. For a discussion of these dissents, see PAULA R. NEWBERG, JUDGING THE STATE:
COURTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN PAKISTAN 48–49, 61, 76–77 (Cambridge S. Asian
Stud., Ser. No. 59, 1995); Tayyab Mahmud, Praetorianism and Common Law in Post-Colonial
Settings: Judicial Responses to Constitutional Breakdowns in Pakistan, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1225,
1234–42 (1993). For a sense of the importance of these dissents in the minds of contemporary
Pakistani champions of the rule of law, see Nasir Iqbal, Disqualification Clause Doesn’t Hit
Musharraf, DAWN (Karachi), Sept. 28, 2007, available at http://karachipage.com/news/Sep_07/09
2807.html#CJ. This article, from one of Pakistan’s leading papers, describes the arguments on
Sept. 28, 2007, before the Supreme Court of Pakistan during the so-called “Lawyers’ Revolt,” in
which liberal lawyers challenged the expansive claims of power made by a military dictator. It
recounts how the liberal President of the Supreme Court Bar Association is said to have described
Justice Cornelius in oral arguments as “one of the most outstanding, dynamic and independent
judges in the history of Pakistan” and urged them to make the choice to protect the principle of
democracy which he characterized as a choice to follow Justice Cornelius. Id.
8. For an analysis of why this might be, see Lombardi, supra note 1, at 461–62.

652

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:3

on secular or Islamic autocrats might lie in a two-pronged program of supporting Islamization while, at the same time, actively pushing for a liberal
interpretation of Shari’a. I will argue, however, that recent scholarship provides some provocative, though ambiguous, evidence that seems to support
this hypothesis.
In my conclusion, I will point out that Cornelius’s hypothesis has significant policy implications not only for Pakistan, but also for the United
States and other nations that have made rule of law promotion a major part
of their foreign policy.9 I argue that it is time for scholars and policy makers
to grapple with his thinking and to do the research necessary to determine
whether it may be even partly true. In this short article, I can do no more
than introduce Cornelius, his hypotheses, and the evidence for and against
these hypotheses. Even in this short discussion, however, I hope to raise
awareness about the full range of sophisticated views that have been articulated over the past fifty years about Islam and constitutional liberty. I hope
also to highlight the need for more systematic and nuanced studies of the
role, or rather the different possible roles, Islam can play in determining the
level of constitutional liberty in contemporary Muslim societies.
II. A. R. CORNELIUS: THE UNLIKELY ISLAMIST
Alvin Robert Cornelius was born in 1903 in Allahabad, in British India, to a family of Indian Christian academics.10 Cornelius’s family had
converted to Protestantism in the early nineteenth century and had prospered under the British. As a young adult, Cornelius married a Catholic and
converted to Catholicism. From that point forward he remained a practicing, and apparently devout, Catholic his whole life.11
Cornelius was marked early for success in British India. After a superb
undergraduate career in India, he was sent on a scholarship to Cambridge
University for further education. He entered Selwyn College, which, at the
time, was Cambridge’s newest college.12 Selwyn was created in the nineteenth century to honor one of Victorian England’s most notable churchmen
and missionaries, Bishop Selwyn. Bishop Selwyn was famous for explaining Britain’s success as a nation and as a colonial power by reference to its
integration of Christian ideals into its legal and political culture.13 Not surprisingly, although it was a college devoted to general education rather than
theology, Selwyn had a far more “Christian” tone than most other colleges
9. See discussion infra Part VI.
10. Much of the biographical information in this section initially appeared in Lombardi,
supra note 1. Most of the facts discussed there (and here) are drawn from BRAIBANTI, supra note
6, at 21–31, and Haider, supra note 6, at 1–10.
11. BRAIBANTI, supra note 6, at 22, 31.
12. SELWYN COLL., SELWYN COLLEGE 1882–1973: A SHORT HISTORY (1973), available at
http://www.sel.cam.ac.uk/college/history1973/.
13. Id.
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and trained a disproportionate number of clergymen.14 Judging from his
later writings, Cornelius was probably impressed at Selwyn by the idea that
a society’s stability, strength, and liberty depended upon its maintaining a
connection between the nation’s law and the religion of the people. While at
Selwyn, Cornelius also enjoyed some diversions, including cricket, which
remained a lifelong passion.15
After finishing at Selwyn, Cornelius took a commission in the powerful and prestigious Indian Civil Service (ICS). The ICS was a crucial institution within the British imperial structure, regularly known as the “steel
frame” of the British empire.16 It was composed of a small cadre of carefully selected and highly trained officials—some British expatriates and
some native Indians. British and Indian members of the ICS served on equal
terms, promoted (or not) on the basis of a strict meritocratic system. The
ICS provided the Raj with its administrative and judicial elite.17
Like most of the native Indian members of the service, Cornelius was
appointed to serve within the judicial rather than the administrative branch
of the ICS.18 Those in the judicial branch served in both legal advisory roles
and as judges in every level of the judicial system. As part of his early
service, Cornelius rotated through trial courts in Punjab Province,19 where
he was struck by the practical difficulty of applying a body of law that,
however good he believed it to be, was understood to be “foreign” and was
resisted by the people.20
After his regional service, Cornelius was eligible for a position in British India’s higher judiciary. In the 1940s, he was appointed to the prestigious High Court in Lahore,21 which had final jurisdiction over disputes from
the Punjab, one of India’s wealthiest provinces.22 Cornelius enjoyed his
14. Id.
15. A passionate cricketer, he had been captain of his cricket team in India and maintained
this interest his whole life. See BRAIBANTI, supra note 6, at 30.
16. The image was one first used to describe the ICS by Prime Minister Lloyd George in a
1922 speech. For a discussion, see DAVID C. POTTER, INDIA’S POLITICAL ADMINISTRATORS
1919–1983, at 88 (1986). Since then, it has entered into common parlance.
17. See STEPHEN COHEN, THE IDEA OF PAKISTAN 41 (2004). For histories of the ICS and its
role in the governance structure of colonial India, see generally ROLAND HUNT & JOHN HARRISON,
THE DISTRICT OFFICER IN INDIA: 1937–47 (1980); BANKEY B. MISRA, THE BUREAUCRACY IN
INDIA: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT UP TO 1947 (1971); Potter, supra note 16.
18. See Arudra Burra, The ICS and the Raj: 1919–1947, at 26–28 (Feb. 11, 2007) (unpublished academic paper, Princeton University), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~aburra/bv11
feb07v1.2.pdf (analyzing the ICS Judicial Branch and explaining why a disproportionate number
of native Indian, as opposed to English-born, officers ended up in this branch). See generally id. at
94–100.
19. For a discussion of his postings, see Haider, supra note 6, at 2–5.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 158–60.
21. For an exhaustive history of the Lahore High Court, see History of Lahore High Court,
Lahore, LAHORE HIGH COURT, http://www.lhc.gov.pk/hstry/history.php (last visited Aug. 2,
2010).
22. Letter from A.R. Cornelius to Ralph Braibanti (Nov. 14, 1977), in CORNELIUS, supra note
6, at 193.
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work on the Court and was extremely happy living in Lahore.23 His satisfaction with his job and his location would affect his life in important ways.
In 1947, the British decided to leave India and agreed to carve their
Indian possessions into two states. The new state of India was to be a multiethnic democracy with an overwhelming Hindu majority. The new state of
Pakistan was to be a majority Muslim state.24 Pakistan would be carved out
of areas with an overwhelming Muslim majority, including much of the
Punjab and the entire city of Lahore. It would be a place where Muslims
could go if they did not want to be governed by a Hindu majority in India.25
That Pakistan was to have a Muslim majority did not mean that it was
supposed to be an “Islamic state.” Those most active in the formation of
Pakistan were “secular” Anglophone members of British India’s Muslim
elite.26 Having prospered under the British regime, they worried that a
Hindu-majority state would discriminate against them and deny them the
access to power and prestige that they had previously enjoyed.27 These
figures had a democratic and liberal vision for their new state. They
imagined Pakistan as a country where a Muslim majority would use representative political mechanisms to determine the types of law that would be
applied, with a judiciary ensuring that majoritarian laws did not violate the
natural rights of citizens in the minority.28 These rights were understood in
essentially common law terms. Figures espousing these views were the
leading proponents of Pakistan and, at independence, they dominated its
military, bureaucratic, and economic elites.29
23. Id. at 23.
24. Discussions of the way in which Colonial India came to be divided into two nations are
found in any history of modern India or modern Pakistan. For one cogent discussion, see COHEN,
supra note 17, at 2–42.
25. See IAN TALBOT, PAKISTAN: A MODERN HISTORY 4–5 (1998) (noting that Pakistan was
initially to be a “Muslim” state and only under General Zia in the 1970s did elites try to reconceptualize it as an “Islamic” one). See generally CHAUDHRI MUHAMMAD ALI, THE EMERGENCE OF
PAKISTAN 39 (1967).
26. For an account by two secularist members of the colonial and immediate post-colonial
elite of their own understanding of the views of Pakistan’s founders, see MUHAMMAD MUNIR &
M.R. KAYANI, REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY CONSTITUTED UNDER PUNJAB ACT II OF 1954
TO ENQUIRE INTO THE PUNJAB DISTURBANCES OF 1953 (1954) [hereinafter THE MUNIR REPORT],
available at http://aaiil.org/text/books/others/misc/munirreport/munirreport.shtml. For a largely
consistent historian’s view, see Tayyab Mahmud, Freedom of Religion & Religious Minorities in
Pakistan: A Study of Judicial Practice, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 40, 51–62 (1995). For a discussion, however, of the nuances and ambiguities latent in the supposedly “secular” Muslim political
philosophy that animated figures like Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leading figure in the creation of
Pakistan, see LEONARD BINDER, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN PAKISTAN 61–69 (1961).
27. For a discussion of the pressures and political calculations that led some (but not all)
Muslim members of India’s elite to support the call for a separate state, see generally ALI, supra
note 25.
28. See id. at 238–39 (describing the views of Pakistan’s founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah
regarding minorities and citing his speeches).
29. See COHEN, supra note 17, at 161–63.
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Opposed to the champions of a “secular” Muslim Pakistan was the
group I call “Islamists.”30 They argued first that the new state should be
required to apply the Shari’a. More important, they insisted that (a) people
could not necessarily be trusted democratically to adopt rules consistent
with Islamic law and (b) there might be circumstances under which liberal
rights principles might be inconsistent with Shari’a, in which case Shari’a
principles should trump. Courts or some other expert institution must be
empowered to strike down un-Islamic legislation—including, possibly,
some legislation that recognized rights that Islamic law did not recognize.31
It took some years for Islamists to present a serious challenge to the stability of the state.
Like all native Indian members of the ICS, Cornelius was given a
choice at Partition:32 he could move to the territories that would become
part of India and remain a member of the Civil Service of India or, alternatively, he could stay in the territory that would become Pakistan and become a member of the Civil Service of Pakistan.33 Happy in Lahore and
comfortable with the philosophy of Pakistan’s secular elites (most of whom
came from the same class and educational background as he did), Cornelius
chose to serve the new Pakistani government.34 He continued to serve on
the Lahore High Court and advised the new government on legal issues—
immediately becoming an important member of the legal elite in the new
country.35 Ever the cricketer, he also volunteered to write the Constitution
of the Pakistan Cricket Board and helped to found a cricket team.36
Cornelius’s decision to take Pakistani citizenship was highly unusual.37 Notwithstanding Pakistan’s leaders’ commitment to establishing a
“secular” Muslim state, many non-Muslims living in the areas slated to become part of Pakistan were concerned about their prospects in an explicitly
“Muslim” state. Presumably, they were also concerned that the state would
evolve into a more “Islamic” one. As a result, most non-Muslims in the ICS
chose to serve the Indian government—if necessary, by moving out of
Pakistan.38
Having made the unusual decision to stay in Pakistan, the Catholic
Cornelius had some misgivings about his choice, particularly as he noted
30. See discussion infra notes 44–49 and accompanying text.
31. See discussion infra notes 52–57 and accompanying text.
32. See BRAIBANTI, supra note 6, at 4, 24.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 193.
35. See id. at 24; Haider, supra note 6, at 3.
36. See BRAIBANTI, supra note 6, at 30.
37. Ralph Braibanti, who was a leading expert on the Indian Civil Service and the Civil
Service of Pakistan, notes that at Partition the majority of ICS officers chose to serve the Indian
government. More striking, only two Indian Christian members of the ICS chose to serve Pakistan. See id. at 4, 24.
38. On the small number of ICS members who chose to serve Pakistan and the important role
they immediately played in establishing the new state, see COHEN, supra note 17, at 41.
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the growing importance of Islamist political discourse in his new home.39
He remembered late in life the distaste with which he viewed the calls for
the new nation to be an “Islamic” state. This was a position that he, at the
time, found “repellent.”40 At the time Cornelius opted to become a citizen
of Pakistan, then, there was nothing to suggest that he had any personal
sympathy for Islam or any political commitment to Islamism (by which I
mean the idea that the state has a constitutional obligation to ensure that its
laws are consistent at all times with Islamic law). Yet within fifteen years,
he would join those who called for Pakistan to systematically Islamize its
legal system. To understand the evolution in his thinking about Islamization, it is important to understand some trends that were taking place in
Pakistan and around the world.
III. CONTEXTUALIZING CORNELIUS’S TURN
PAKISTAN IN THE 1950S

TO

ISLAMISM:

Three developments during the 1950s seem to have pushed Cornelius
along the unlikely path towards an idiosyncratic modernist form of Islamism. Two were unique to Pakistan and one global. The first development
was the growth of Islamist political power in Pakistan. The second was the
collapse of the secular, liberal democratic constitutional order in Pakistan
and its replacement by a secular illiberal autocracy. The third was the apparent success of Arab Middle East programs of legal reform that reconceptualized “European” legal systems in Islamic terms.
A. The Growing Power of Islamists in Pakistan
As already noted, the drive to create a Muslim state in the subcontinent
was led by “secular” Muslim members of the Indian economic and administrative elite.41 The British acts that granted independence to Pakistan left
these secular elites in control. They inherited great problems, including a
severe challenge to their secular vision of the state.
At the time of independence, Pakistan was composed of two non-contiguous bodies of land: West Pakistan (now Pakistan), and East Pakistan
(since 1971, the independent nation of Bangladesh). These two entities
were very different from each other and there were tensions between the
populations of Pakistan’s two wings.42 Among the many challenges the
government faced was that of creating a national ideology that would hold
39. During Pakistan’s early years, one of the things that Cornelius claimed particularly to
dislike was the fact that Pakistani political and legal discussions turned so often to the question of
what role Islam should play in the Pakistani state. At that time, such discussions were, he said,
“repellent.” See BRAIBANTI, supra note 6, at 193–94.
40. See id.
41. See BINDER, supra note 26, at 117.
42. See TALBOT, supra note 25, at 24–25 (describing how different the societies of West and
East Pakistan were).
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the nation together.43 After independence, Islamists quickly demonstrated
their broad popularity among the many segments of the Pakistani polity. To
the distress of many in the secular elite, no alternative ideology appeared
with the same motivating and potentially unifying power.
Before going on, it is important to note that the term “Islamist” is currently a fraught one. Some use it to refer only to people who believe that the
government must govern in a manner that is consistent with a highly illiberal interpretation of Islamic law and who favor authoritarian governance
and the application of laws that are inconsistent with Western liberal values.44 For reasons that I have discussed in other publications, I find that
problematic.45 I use the term “Islamist” in this article to refer to anyone
who believes that state action (including state law) must respect supra-legislative principles of Islamic law and thus that courts, or some other forms of
independent institutions, will be empowered to review and void any unIslamic laws that misguided elites or majorities might from time to time try
to impose.46 They are “Islamists” irrespective of whether their interpretation of Islam is liberal or illiberal.
Although British India, and later Pakistan, contained important liberal
Islamist thinkers,47 illiberal Islamists, in the years immediately following
Partition, established themselves as the Islamist voices with the greatest
popular support in Pakistan.48 These illiberal Islamists in Pakistan did not,
however, speak with a single voice. Competing factions disagreed in significant ways about who could authoritatively interpret Islamic law, about how
interpreters should interpret it, and ultimately about what rules precisely an
Islamic government actually had to apply.49
Many of Pakistan’s most powerful Islamist groups subscribed to a
“traditionalist” interpretation of Islam. Traditionalists posited that only
classically-trained scholars belonging to established (and generally con43. See id. at 25 (particularly the quote from East Pakistani representatives during the debates
over Pakistan’s first constitution).
44. See, e.g., Pipes, supra note 2. But see COHEN, supra note 17, at 162.
45. See Lombardi & Brown, supra note 4, at 412–25.
46. See BINDER, supra note 26, at 102–08, 138–41.
47. Among the most famous examples historically were Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Amir Ali,
Muhammad Iqbal and, more recently, Javed Ghamidi. For a discussion of the first three, see
generally WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH, MODERN ISLAM IN INDIA: A SOCIAL ANALYSIS 7–135
(1946). For a discussion of Ghamidi’s thought on one area where liberals and non-liberals tend to
divide, see Muhammad Khalid Masud, Rethinking Shari’a: Javed Ahmad Ghamidi on Hudud, 47
DIE WELT DES ISLAMS 356 (2007).
48. For a description of some of the Islamist actors who would move to Pakistan and become
active in Islamic politics, and a description of their earliest activities in post-Partition Pakistan, see
BINDER, supra note 26, at 26–33, 70–108.
49. For an overview of the tensions, see Leonard Binder, Problems of Islamic Political
Thought in the Light of Recent Developments in Pakistan, 20 J. POL. 655 (1958), which itself
draws upon an analytic framework set out in SMITH, supra note 47.
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servative) scholarly guilds could properly interpret Islam.50 The institutions
entrusted with the duty of performing Islamic review would have to be
staffed primarily or entirely by these classically trained scholars. In Pakistan, these scholars tended to favor interpretations of Islamic law that were
in tension with Western, liberal notions of justice.51 Traditionalist Islamists
thus espoused a vision of the state that seemed irreconcilable with the secular elite’s vision at almost every level.
Other Islamist groups, such as Maulana Mawdudi’s small but extremely powerful Jama’at-i-Islami, championed what might be termed “lay”
Islamism.52 Lay Islamists championed a different method of legal interpretation than the traditionalists, insisting that people without a classical Islamic education could interpret Islamic law—indeed they might be better at
doing it than traditionalists.53 Unlike traditionalists, lay Islamists were comfortable with the idea that Islamization would be managed through a modified form of the current governmental structure. Breaking with traditionalist
Islamist groups,54 the Jama’at-i-Islami proposed that Pakistan revise its current constitution as follows—it should maintain in most respects its existing
structure of government, but add a constitutional amendment requiring all
law to be consistent with Islamic law.55 The sitting judiciary would be entrusted the responsibility to exercise judicial review of legislation to guarantee that all law satisfied this provision.56
50. On traditionalist scholars and their supporters, see BINDER, supra note 26, at 25–33. For
more detailed studies, some critical of Binder’s analysis, see, for example, BARBARA DALY METCALF, ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN BRITISH INDIA: DEOBAND, 1860–1900 (1982) (studying the evolution
of the institutions and thinking of traditionalist Islamist scholars in late nineteenth century British
India) and MUHAMMAD QASIM ZAMAN, THE ULAMA IN CONTEMPORARY ISLAM: CUSTODIANS OF
CHANGE (2002) (analyzing the philosophy and activities of traditionalists in, inter alia, Pakistan).
51. I would like to highlight the guardedness of this comment. “Tended to be” does not mean
“were always” and “in tension” with does not mean “irreconcilable” or even “inconsistent” with.
For a nuanced view of the `ulamā’s construction of authority, their commitment to a discursive
tradition with roots in the pre-modern position, and the tensions that this can lead to with respect
to modernist or liberal thought, see ZAMAN, supra note 50, at 17–37. This is a useful corrective to
more categorical statements such as those found in BINDER, supra note 26, at 10–33. Binder’s
view was shaped by the fact that he lived in Pakistan during a period in which, as a practical
matter, notwithstanding the possibility of liberal thought among the Pakistani `ulamā, their most
visible spokespeople did, in fact, take illiberal positions. Even he ended on a more cautious note.
See id. at 377–78. This fact certainly impressed most Pakistani secularists and liberals.
52. On the phenomenon of “lay Islam,” see generally MODERNIST ISLAM, 1840–1940: A
SOURCEBOOK 8 (Charles Kurzman ed., 2002); for an explanation of the social and political forces
that led it to emerge in the Middle East, see LOMBARDI, supra note 4, at 59–77.
53. On the evolution of lay Islamism in India and its further evolution in Pakistan, see
BINDER, supra note 26, at 70–108. The tensions between the lay Islamists and the traditionalists
are also described in ZAMAN, supra note 50, at 102–05.
54. Traditionalist and lay Islamists struggled to develop compromise ideas in which hybrid
scholarly/judicial institutions would carry out Islamization. See BINDER, supra note 26, at 259–92.
55. Maulana Maududi, Some Constitutional Proposals for the Consideration of the C.A.P., in
BINDER, supra note 26, at 265.
56. Id.
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This proposal appeared to offer Pakistan’s current elites a compromise.
Islamists would enshrine in the Constitution an enforceable countermajoritarian guarantee that all law be consistent with Islamic law. As everyone knew, however, members of the contemporary “secular” elite still dominated the judiciary. So long as this group maintained their control over the
judiciary, they would be able to shape the interpretation of Islamic law that
informed court decisions, and, at least in the short term, ensure that Pakistani laws were measured against liberal interpretations of Islamic law.57
As both Mawdudi and liberals also realized, however, the “secular”
elite might not be able to maintain its control over the judiciary indefinitely.
The growing political power of illiberal Islamists might soon give them
significant control over education and possibly judicial appointments. Accepting Mawdudi’s proposal would likely usher in a period of struggle between liberals and illiberals to shape the popular and judicial understanding
of Islam. Mawdudi and his Islamist allies believed that he would win this
struggle.58 Many secular Pakistanis feared Mawdudi was correct and, in any
case, did not want to take the chance.
Mistrust between secular liberals and Islamists grew in the early 1950s
after a spate of Islamist violence directed against members of the Ahmadi
sect of Islam, a small and highly controversial Islamic sect, whose members
included powerful members of Pakistan’s Anglophone elite.59 In 1952, parties led by classically trained religious scholars but supported by the
Jama’at-i-Islami attacked the Ahmadi sect of Islam, declaring it heretical
and asking the government to ban the propagation of its doctrines.60 When
the government refused to accede to these demands, some Islamist parties
began to promote violence. Taking advantage of a food shortage and
broader political discontent, Muslim politicians cynically used anti-Ahmadi
rallies to muster support for broader anti-government, pro-Islamist positions—a pattern that ultimately led to destructive riots and eventually martial law in parts of Pakistan.61
In 1954, after re-establishing order, the government created a special
Court of Inquiry tasked to look into the disturbances. The Court was headed
by two respected members of the legal elite, both, like Cornelius, members
of the ICS. The President of the Court was Justice Muhammad Munir of
Pakistan’s highest court (the Federal Court, which was soon to be renamed
the Supreme Court).62 The Deputy was Justice M. R. Kayani of the Lahore
57. See BINDER, supra note 26, at 285–92; ZAMAN, supra note 50, at 88–89.
58. See BINDER, supra note 26, at 285–92.
59. For an exhaustive history of Ahmadism, see generally YOHANAN FRIEDMANN, PROPHECY
CONTINUOUS (1989).
60. See BINDER, supra note 26, at 259–96; Mahmud, supra note 26, at 65–66. For an exhaustive account, see also THE MUNIR REPORT, supra note 26, at 1–181.
61. See BINDER, supra note 26, at 292–95.
62. See generally NAZIR HUSSAIN CHAUDHRI, CHIEF JUSTICE MUHAMMAD MUNIR: HIS LIFE,
WRITINGS AND JUDGMENTS (1973).
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High Court, one of Pakistan’s most zealous champions of liberal constitutionalism and a good friend of Cornelius.63 The Court’s report, sometimes
called the “Munir Report,”64 noted that Islamic rhetoric seemed to have
remarkable power to motivate the masses in Pakistan.65 It also lamented
that Pakistanis seemed overwhelmingly to find illiberal versions of Islamism more compelling than liberal ones.66 The Munir Report authors warned
that liberals were naı̈ve if they thought that Islamism would evolve in the
near future into a philosophy that was consistent with modern modes of
state structuring or with the principles of Western liberal philosophy.67 Arguably going beyond the scope of their assignment, Justices Munir and
Kayani opined in their report that Pakistani liberals should resist any attempt to formally modify their existing “secular” but democratic mode of
governance. Islamism, as Pakistanis actually understood it, was entirely inconsistent with the operation of a modern, liberal state:
[I]rreconcilables remain irreconcilables even if you believe or
wish to the contrary. As long as we rely on the hammer when a
file is needed and press Islam into service to solve solutions it
was never intended to solve [i.e., the question of what laws to
apply in a modern state] frustration and disappointment must dog
our steps.68
63. After Pakistan’s 1958 coup, Kayani became one of the military’s chief critics and is
today lionized, along with Cornelius, as one of Pakistan’s two most fervent judicial champions of
the rule of law. Unlike Cornelius, however, he never came to believe that Islamists could be useful
allies in the project to build the rule of law or that Islamization could ever advance the cause of
liberalism. See Muhammad Munawar, Foreword to M.R. KAYANI, LETTERS BY JUSTICE KAYANI
iii–iv (M. Bashir Hussain ed., 1974); Justice S.A. Rahman, Foreword to M.R. KAYANI, HALF
TRUTHS iv–v (1st ed. 1966); Foreword to M.R. KAYANI, THE WHOLE TRUTH 1–21 (1st ed. 1988);
M.R. KAYANI, THE WHOLE TRUTH 40–43 (1st ed. 1988). Most extraordinarily, if elliptically, see
the foreword to a posthumous collection of Kayani’s writings, written by Field Marshal Ayub
Khan, the dictator who was the subject of many acid comments by Kayani. M. Ayub Khan, Foreword in M.R. Kayani, NOT THE WHOLE TRUTH, I (2d ed. 1962).
64. THE MUNIR REPORT, supra note 26.
65. Id. at 231 (“If there is one thing which has been conclusively demonstrated in this inquiry, it is that provided you can persuade the masses to believe that something they are asked to
do is religiously right or enjoined by religion, you can set them to any course of action, regardless
of all considerations of discipline, loyalty, decency, morality or civic sense.”). See also JOHN
ESPOSITO, ISLAM AND POLITICS 115, 281–82 (3d ed. 1991); BARBARA DALY METCALF, ISLAM IN
SOUTH ASIA IN PRACTICE 424–28 (Barbara D. Metcalf ed., 2009); SEYYED VALI REZA NASR, THE
VANGUARD OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 139 (1994).
66. THE MUNIR REPORT, supra note 26, at 200–31.
67. Id. at 232 (“Nothing but a bold re-orientation of Islam to separate the vital from the
lifeless can preserve it as a World Idea and convert the Musalman into a citizen of the present and
the future world from the archaic incongruity that he is today. It is this lack of bold and clear
thinking, the inability to understand and take decisions which has brought Pakistan [into] confusion . . . .”).
68. Id. See also the discussion in BINDER, supra note 26, at 342–44. Note also the extreme
skepticism with which Kayani and others later viewed Cornelius’s eventual call for judges to
Islamize Pakistani law, discussed in BRAIBANTI, supra note 6, at 47.
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We have no record of Cornelius’s views during the early 1950s about
whether Islamization should be viewed as a threat to the inherited political
system and to the liberal rule of law. Cornelius in 1954 may have agreed
with the authors of the Munir Report that Islamism was a tiger that no
liberal should try to ride.69 If so, however, Cornelius’s opinion gradually
began to change by the early 1960s.
By the early 1960s, Cornelius was arguing that those committed to
uphold the liberal democratic rule of law should support a constitutional
structure that looked in some ways like the one Mawdudi had proposed in
the early 1950s.70 He called on legal professionals and judges and others
with a vested interest in the preservation of the liberal rule of law to support
the Islamization of the legal system so long as they, the judiciary, retained
the authority to define the government’s official interpretation of Islamic
law. However, he also stressed that liberal legal professionals on the judiciary and in the bar should undertake a systematic effort to study Islamic law
and to articulate liberal democratic philosophy in Islamic terms so that they
could win those inclined to Islamism over to a liberal rather than an illiberal
interpretation of Islamic law. In short, Cornelius advocated the abandonment of secular liberal democracy in favor of an Islamist system that he
(contrary to Munir and Kayani) thought might conceivably embrace liberal
democratic ideals.
To understand the evolution in Cornelius’s thinking, we need to consider two factors. The first is Cornelius’s distress about the rise of secular
authoritarianism in Pakistan and his skepticism that secular government in
Pakistan could ever govern effectively under a secular liberal constitutionalist philosophy. The second is Cornelius’s growing awareness of liberal Islamic legal reforms in the Arab Middle East. The first trend made him
realize that secularism in post-colonial Pakistan could never be as liberal as
the Munir Report’s authors had hoped. The second made him think that
Islamism in Pakistan could be implemented in a fashion that was more liberal than they had feared.
B. The Collapse of Secular Liberal Democracy and the Rise of Secular
Autocracy in Pakistan
In the years after the publication of the Munir Report, Pakistan went
through a period of constitutional turmoil. At the time of independence,
Pakistan did not have a constitution and chose to retain, for the most part,
the existing colonial governmental structure.71 Pakistan’s inherited legisla69. Indeed, he strongly implied as much in a letter to his friend Ralph Braibanti. See BRAIsupra note 6, at 193.
70. See discussion infra Part IV.
71. See, e.g., NEWBERG, supra note 7, at 36–37; DONALD WILBUR, PAKISTAN: YESTERDAY
AND TODAY 120 (1964); Mahmud, supra note 7, at 1231–34.
BANTI,
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ture, the Constituent Assembly, struggled for years to draft a new
Constitution.72
Pakistan’s elites strove from the time Pakistan gained independence to
develop a constitutional ideology that would generate broad popular support, hold the state together, and provide popular support for the government as it struggled with massive challenges. The most promising unifying
ideology, at least from the perspective of mass mobilization, seemed to be
Islamism. As we have seen, however, many members of Pakistan’s military, bureaucratic, and judicial elites found Islamism a highly problematic
basis on which to ground their state. If these figures had been confident that
Islam would always be interpreted in a liberal fashion, they might have
been comfortable with the popular call for Islamization. As noted already,
however, popular Islamism tended to take an illiberal form, and secularists
feared that the most powerful Islamists had a potentially totalitarian vision
of the state.73 Particularly after the shock of the anti-Ahmadi riots, powerful
members of Pakistan’s secularist elite proved unwilling to maintain a constitutional order in which illiberal Islamists could democratically take
power.
By the mid-1950s, however, the existing secular, quasi-liberal, quasidemocratic constitutional regime that Pakistan had inherited from the British had begun to come under pressure. By 1958, it had collapsed and was
replaced by an unapologetically secularist, authoritarian, praetorian
regime.74
Pakistan’s slide into military rule began in the mid-1950s, when Pakistan’s executive branch, the branch most firmly under the control of Pakistan’s secular elites, began to aggrandize itself at the expense of the
Constituent Assembly, which was seen as increasingly sympathetic to regionalists and Islamists.75 Ascending to the Supreme Court in 1954, Cornelius immediately found himself among a minority of justices disturbed by
the executive’s increasingly authoritarian claims to power.
The division among the justices became clear when the Court, over
Cornelius’s vigorous dissents, approved the Governor General’s claim to
expansive powers—including power to unilaterally declare a state of emer-

72. See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD CONSTITUTIONS 689–90 (Gerhard Roberts ed. 2007);
NEWBERG, supra note 7, at 36–42.
73. See discussion infra Part III.A.
74. I and others have analyzed elsewhere the history of Pakistan’s drift into authoritarianism
and the cases in which the Court, with Cornelius dissenting, approved the executive’s ever more
ambitious claims to power. See NEWBERG, supra note 7, at 35–68; Lombardi, supra note 1, at
436–65; Mahmud, supra note 7, at 1225–52.
75. See analysis in NEWBERG, supra note 7, at 35–60; Lombardi, supra note 1, at 442–44;
Mahmud, supra note 7, at 1233–34.
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gency and, during a state of emergency, to legislate.76 In 1954, a state of
emergency was declared. Shortly after constitutional government was restored, in 1956, Pakistan finally enacted its first Constitution.77 The 1956
constitution tried to balance popular Islamist pressures and liberal concerns
of the elite, establishing a representative form of government, and requiring
the government both to respect Islam and protect fundamental rights.78 This
Constitution was short-lived.
In 1958, the government scheduled its first set of elections under the
new Constitution. Powerful members of the secular elite quickly became
nervous about the growing power of both regionalists and Islamists in the
popular sphere. Their dissatisfaction grew as the 1958 elections approached,
in part because regionalist and Islamist parties were likely to come to
power. Ultimately, secularist elites acted decisively to prevent the democratic rise of regionalists and Islamists. First, the Constitution was suspended by the President. Within days, the President was himself removed in
a military coup staged by secularist military officers.79
The military junta quickly made clear that they were not imposing a
temporary state of emergency. Rather, they were bringing to a close Pakistan’s experiment with representative parliamentary democracy and imposing an indefinite period of “guided democracy.”80 In one of its first acts, the
military issued an order abrogating the 1956 Constitution and all laws enacted pursuant to it.81 The military stated that, at some point in the indefinite future, a new constitution would be promulgated by military order and
this new constitution would establish a form of secular guided democracy.
In the meantime, to prevent a complete legal vacuum, courts were instructed to enforce all laws that were in force before the coup, except for
constitutional provisions protecting fundamental rights and laws that were
inconsistent with military orders.82
76. The Federation of Pakistan v. Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan, (1955) PLD (FC) 240 (Pak.);
Special Reference #1 of 1955 (Referenced by His Excellency, the Governor General), (1955) PLD
(FC) 435 (Pak.).
77. PAKISTAN CONST. OF 1956, reprinted in G.W. CHOUDHURY, DOCUMENTS AND SPEECHES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF PAKISTAN 395 (1967).
78. The 1956 Pakistan Constitution (1) explains that the President shall be elected by an
electoral college, id. at art. 32, § 1; (2) describes that the National Assembly members shall be
elected by the constituencies, id. at art. 4; (3) requires that the state support Muslim citizens and
their religious beliefs, id. at art. 25; and (4) defines the fundamental rights of the citizens, id. at
Part III.
79. For a brief description of this period, see COHEN, supra note 17, at 56–68.
80. For a discussion of guided democracy as a concept, see Jose Arsenio Torres, The Political Ideology of Guided Democracy, 25 REV. POL. 34 (1963). As this article makes clear, it is most
commonly used to refer to Indonesian authoritarian government during the post-war era, but Pakistan’s military promoted a very similar type of rule. See id. at 50–53.
81. Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, No. 1 of 1958, THE GAZETTE OF PAKISTAN EXTRAORDINARY, Oct. 10, 1958.
82. Id. (providing that “all courts in existence immediately before the Proclamation shall
continue in being and, subject further to the provisions of this Order, in their powers and jurisdic-
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The courts were quickly asked to rule on the legality of both the coup
and the military’s claim that, during the period between two constitutions, a
military could rule with unchecked power. Cornelius was the only member
of the Supreme Court willing to challenge the military’s claim that it could
rule with entirely unchecked power.
In State v. Dosso and Another,83 several convicted criminals challenged their convictions on the ground that their trial had violated fundamental rights traditionally protected at common law and specifically
protected under the allegedly abrogated 1956 Constitution.84 The military
ordered the Court not to hear the claim, asserting that the government was
no longer bound to respect fundamental rights and that, accordingly, the
citizens had no justiciable claim.85 Over Cornelius’s lone dissent86 the majority agreed with the military and dismissed the case.87 According to the
majority, a usurping, unelected government could rule indefinitely without
recognizing any legal obligation to protect fundamental rights.88 A year
later, in Province of East Pakistan v. Mehdi Ali Khan,89 a new plaintiff
asked the court to overrule its earlier Dosso ruling and assert that henceforth the government would have to permit courts to issue binding orders
protecting citizens from violations of their fundamental rights. Cornelius
was the only judge who agreed with the plaintiff.90
I have elsewhere described in depth Cornelius’s opinions in Dosso and
Mehdi Ali Khan, which must be read together.91 As I point out there, his
theories demonstrate a commitment to contractual theories of constitutional
law. Citing traditional common law authorities, Cornelius insisted that
whenever a people agrees to form a nation, its members give their conditional assent to be governed and set about determining the type of governtions.”). However, the courts had no power to compel “the Chief Administrator of Martial Law or
the Deputy Chief Administrator of Martial Law or any person exercising powers or jurisdiction
under the authority of either” to respect their interpretation. Id. Instead of compulsive writ power
against the executive, the Courts maintained only the right to issue a non-binding advisory opinion. Id.
83. State v. Dosso and Another, (1958) PLD (SC) 533 (Pak.).
84. Id.
85. NEWBERG, supra note 7, at 72–78; Mahmud, supra note 7, at 1248–49.
86. See Dosso, (1958) PLD (SC) at 553–62 (Cornelius, J. concurring). Note, for example,
that Cornelius’s opinion in Dosso was technically a concurrence rather than a dissent. Cornelius
thought that the military could not take away courts’ inherent, supra-legislative power to enforce
citizens’ rights against governmental abuse; however, he thought the petitioners’ claims, though
they could be heard, would fail on the merits. Id. at 533.
87. Dosso, (1958) PLD (SC) at 533. The opinions in this case have been analyzed in many
places. See, e.g., NEWBERG, supra note 7, at 73–76; Lombardi, supra note 1, at 446–50; Mahmud,
supra note 7, at 1244–51.
88. Dosso, (1958) PLD (SC) at 541.
89. Province of East Pakistan v. Mehdi Ali Khan, (1959) PLD (SC) 387 (Pak.).
90. Id. at 435–40 (Cornelius, J., dissenting).
91. See Lombardi, supra note 1, at 446–53.
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mental structure that they trust to govern them.92 The people may disagree
about the precise nature of the government that takes power. If so, they
create the possibility that different types of government might be able to
legitimately rule. The people will nevertheless agree on certain core principles, and, from that time forward, whatever government is formed must
respect those core principles.93 Drawing (without citation) on a thinker that
he had long admired, the American judge and constitutional theorist
Thomas Cooley,94 Cornelius insisted that no government can contravene
the “settled expectations” that the people hold for any government that asserts power over them.95
In Cornelius’s mind, then, the military could legitimately dissolve an
old constitutional regime and had considerable discretion in shaping a new
regime. Like all governments, however, the new regime was always obliged
to respect the “settled habits and sentiments” of the people. These included
the expectation that the executive would respect common law fundamental
rights as they had been elaborated by the judiciary.96 Thus, Cornelius insisted, the Supreme Court must creatively interpret the Order so as to not
strip judges of their power to protect fundamental rights from executive
abuse.97
Cornelius’s view was rejected by his colleagues. Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Munir decisively rejected Cornelius’s basic constitutionalist premise—the idea that the people of a nation, at the time of its
creation, establish principles that act as a limit on the powers of all future
rulers of the nation, and that judges must interpret and apply law to ensure
that it is consistent with those principles.98 Rather, Munir and the majority
adopted a positivist doctrine of revolutionary legality that they attributed
(perhaps unfairly) to Hans Kelsen.99 As Munir saw it, any military govern92. See Mehdi Ali Khan, (1959) PLD (SC) at 439 (Cornelius, J., dissenting) (asserting that
the government of any nation is bound by “that body of rules and maxims in accordance with
which the powers of Sovereignty are habitually exercised.”).
93. Id.
94. Cooley was clearly important to Cornelius and Cornelius had previously cited him in his
dissent in The Federation of Pakistan v. Moulvi Tanzumiddin Khan, (1955) PLD (FC) 240, 363,
365, 395, 399 (Pak.) (Cornelius, J., dissenting). Compare Mehdi Ali Khan, (1959) PLD (SC) at
439 (Cornelius, J., dissenting) (asserting that the government of any nation is bound by “that body
of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of Sovereignty are habitually exercised.”), with THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 2
(2d ed. 1871).
95. See Mehdi Ali Khan, (1959) PLD (SC) at 439 (Cornelius, J., dissenting).
96. See id.
97. See id. at 441.
98. Id. at 398–414 (majority opinion).
99. See Dosso, (1958) PLD (SC) at 539. For a summary of later Pakistani judicial opinions
challenging Munir’s interpretation of Kelsen’s philosophy and Western academic commentary
that makes similar criticisms, see A. B. M. MAFIZUL ISLAM PATWARI, PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE MARTIAL LAW IN PAKISTAN 1958–1962, at 60–72
(1988).
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ment that had the power to put down resistance wrote on a blank slate. If
the Pakistani military had demonstrated the ability to forcibly “require the
inhabitants of the country to conform to [its] new regime,” then the only
laws in force were those that the military created.100 Courts must recognize
that they had no power to enforce any constitutional principles, including
principles protecting citizens’ fundamental rights, unless the new regime
granted the courts this power.101
Munir’s argument appalled Cornelius. For the rest of his life, he argued against the positivist claims that Munir had made in Dosso and Mehdi
Ali Khan. Cornelius urged lawyers and judges to think of ways that they
could more effectively articulate their claim that governments were morally
bound to respect supra-legislative constitutional principles, including natural rights principles. His call to Islamize the Pakistani legal system must
ultimately be seen as part of this project.
After Chief Justice Munir’s retirement in 1960, Cornelius found himself the most senior justice on the severely weakened Supreme Court. In
keeping with Court tradition, he became its new Chief Justice.102 In that
capacity, Cornelius wrote to the head of the army, Field Marshal Ayub
Khan, and insisted that Dosso and Mehdi Ali Khan were wrongly decided,
and posited that he might be able to muster the votes to overturn them.
Cornelius believed the government should see itself as bound to respect
fundamental rights as traditionally articulated by courts and to avoid conflict with the courts.103 He suggested that if the military was worried about
an open-ended guarantee of “fundamental rights,” it might actually include
a bill of rights modeled on the U.S. Bill of Rights.104 His suggestions fell on
deaf ears. In 1962, the President of Pakistan, by executive order, promulgated a praetorian constitution which did not contain a provision permitting
courts to enforce fundamental rights.105
Perhaps anticipating this rebuff, Cornelius had already begun to reflect
more deeply on natural rights theory and on the reasons why it had collapsed and not been re-established in Pakistan. In a remarkable 1960
speech, Cornelius commented sourly that he and many other Pakistani liber100. See Dosso, (1958) PLD (SC) at 539. See also the analysis in NEWBERG, supra note 7, at
72–78, 86–88, and Lombardi, supra note 1, at 447–50.
101. See Mehdi Ali Khan, (1959) PLD (SC) at 406. It is unclear why Munir and his colleagues
had adopted the extreme positivist position that they did, one that Pakistani legal historian Tayyab
Mahmud described as “as complete an abdication of judicial power” as one could imagine. Mahmud, supra note 7, at 1245.
102. It may seem surprising that the military allowed its only serious critic on the court to rise
to the position of Chief Justice. Clearly, the military felt that the judiciary had been subjugated
and it could simply ignore Cornelius if he proved troublesome. Indeed, that is exactly what it
found itself doing.
103. See A.R. Cornelius, Some Constitutional Proposals for Pakistan, in CORNELIUS, supra
note 6, at 184–201, particularly the discussion tactfully put towards the end at 187–88.
104. Id. at 198.
105. PAKISTAN CONST. of 1962.
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als had been too quick to assume that fundamental British common law
rights principles would continue to be respected by the non-British rulers
who replaced them.106 This was because they had forgotten to ask why
Britons had accepted judicially articulated natural rights principles as legally binding principles independent from (and superior to) positive law.
Cornelius suggested that British judges had taken steps to justify their claim
to be authoritative interpreters of supra-legislative norms. Based on his
reading of British legal history, Cornelius argued that judges had convinced
Britons and the British king to recognize the supra-constitutional power of
fundamental rights only after those judges had convincingly described judicially articulated fundamental rights principles as norms that reflected the
command of Christian law. British judges, he claimed, had described their
rulings as justified in an unwritten law that was consistent with “the dictates
of the religion they [the British] professed.”107 Precisely because British
judges in the past had been able to establish judicial notions of justice as
ones with a divine pedigree, contemporary Britain enjoyed a society in
which, “it can be said with pride that the function of justice claims a higher
origin than mere law.”108 By tying “their obligations to a higher power than
any which they see around them, the [British] Judges afford, and will continue to afford, a strong guarantee, that, be the law what it may, they will
not hesitate to view it as favouring liberty for the public.”109
Repeatedly thereafter, Cornelius gave speeches to members of Pakistan’s Anglophone liberal elite, most of them inclined to secularism, and
reminded them that (as he understood it) British judges had learned how to
articulate their notions of “justice” in religious terms that impressed both
rulers and the ruled. In a 1964 speech he told his audience:
In the year 1653 a Judge in England did not hesitate to pronounce
that: “There is no law in England, but is as really and truly the
law of God as any Scripture phrase, that is by consequence from
the very texts of Scripture: for there are very many consequences
reasoned out of the texts of Scripture; so is the law of England the
very consequence of the very Decalogue itself: and whatsoever is
not Consonant to Scripture in the law of England is not the law of
England . . . be it Acts of Parliament, customs or any judicial acts
of the Court, it is not the law of England.” That was said at a
stage when the Courts of England being dissatisfied with the legislation of the time, were searching for grounds on which they
could declare the legislative dictates as invalid.110
106. A.R. Cornelius, Law and Liberty, Speech at the Inauguration of the Political Science
Society of Edwardes College at Peshawar (Nov. 3, 1960), in CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at 47–52.
107. Id. at 51.
108. Id. at 52.
109. Id.
110. A.R. Cornelius, Function of Law as a Link Between Nations, Speech at Pakistan Institute
of International Affairs (June 4, 1964), in CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at 147.
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Cornelius also pointed out that obedience to these religiouslygrounded rule of law principles became so habitual that judges stopped having to justify their laws in religious terms. Furthermore, even after judges
had come to formally recognize the supremacy of parliament, no one challenged them when they interpreted statutes creatively so as to ensure that
they never violated judicial notions of justice.111
It is not hard to see where Cornelius’s thinking was going. In 1958,
the courts were struggling to get Pakistan’s leaders to recognize a moral
obligation to respect natural rights as articulated by courts. Courts trying to
justify natural rights in the language of common law constitutional theory
had failed to do so. Four years earlier, in 1954, the Munir Report had concluded, “If there is one thing which has been conclusively demonstrated in
this inquiry, it is that provided you can persuade the masses to believe that
something they are asked to do is religiously right or enjoined by religion,
you can set them to any course of action . . . .”112 Cornelius seemed to be
wondering whether Pakistani judges could follow the lead of British judges
centuries earlier and convincingly argue that violation of court orders represented a repudiation of God’s command. If so, the Pakistani government
might come to obey judicial orders protecting fundamental rights in the
same way that the British government did. Ideally, obedience would be out
of moral conviction, but could also arise out of fear that violations of orders
that were understood to reflect Shari’a principles might lead the public to
revolt. As Cornelius put it a few years later, fundamental rights principles
had come to be recognized as “higher law” in early modern Britain as binding on rulers and ruled alike only because judges had successfully “sanctified” them in religious terms.113 Fundamental rights principles might
achieve the same status in Pakistan if they were “re-sanctified” in the eyes
of Pakistan’s Muslim rulers and masses—through a process of connecting
them to the religion not of the departed colonial master but of their own
indigenous Islamic beliefs.114
Was it realistic to hope that judges could convince people Islam required governments to respect liberal rights principles? In 1954, Munir and
Kayani had suggested that it was not. Whether or not Islam could be interpreted in a manner consistent with liberal philosophy, these two judges suggested that the public would always trust illiberal Islamist thinkers more
111. See id. at 147–48. This last observation was freighted with significance, for it was precisely this type of creative, justice-promoting statutory interpretation that a majority of judges on
the Supreme Court had found themselves unwilling (or unable) to do in Dosso and Mehdi Ali
Khan.
112. THE MUNIR REPORT, supra note 26, at 231.
113. See BRAIBANTI, supra note 6, at 193 (suggesting that if Pakistan went through a process
of establishing the consistency of its law with Islamic principles, the law would come to be
“resanctified”).
114. Id.
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than liberal ones.115 In the early 1960s, however, Cornelius began to think
that Munir and Kayani might be wrong, in part because of legal developments in the Arab Middle East.
C. Liberal Middle Eastern Legal Reform and the Rise of the Sanhūrı̄
Codes
It is unclear when A. R. Cornelius first became interested in the history
of modern Arab legal reform or how deep his studies of it were.116 All we
can say for sure is that in the 1960s, he began publicly to argue that the
liberal rule of law became established in Britain through a process of sanctification. In those same speeches, he began to draw attention to recent programs of Arab legal reform in the Middle East, Egypt, and North Africa. To
Cornelius, the experience of those countries demonstrated that, contrary to
the fears expressed in the Munir Report, lawyers with “secular” legal training could be taken seriously by the masses as Islamic thinkers and could
push the law in a liberal direction. Arab legal reformers trained in both
Islamic texts and in transplanted colonial “law” had reconceptualized inherited colonial laws and legal principles as “Islamic” legal principles.117 Just
as British judges had been able to sanctify the common law in Christian
terms, these reformers, Middle Eastern judges and lawyers, had been able to
sanctify progressive modern codes of law in Islamic terms. To understand
Cornelius’s speeches, it is important to be familiar with the work of the
influential Egyptian lawyer, judge, and academic Abdel Razzaq al-Sanhūrı̄,
and, in particular, with the spread throughout the Arab world of so-called
“Sanhūrı̄ Codes.”
In the 1930s, Egypt had faced a political situation similar, in many
ways, to the situation facing Pakistan in the ’50s. The British invasion of
Egypt in 1882 led to the abolition of Egypt’s Ottoman-style, explicitly Islamic legal system, and its replacement by, ironically, a French-style civilian legal system.118 In the 1920s, after Britain unilaterally granted
115. See discussion supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text.
116. Braibanti suggests that it was only in 1964 that Cornelius received as a gift from the Iraqi
Amabassador to Pakistan his first copy of the Ottoman Majalla. See Braibanti, supra note 6, at 34.
The Majalla was a late nineteenth-century attempt to “codify” traditional Islamic legal principles
in a manner that would allow these principles to govern the civil law of a modern country. BRINKLEY MESSICK, THE CALLIGRAPHIC STATE: TEXTUAL DOMINATION AND HISTORY IN A MUSLIM SOCIETY 54–55 (1993). He had, however, already given speeches urging Pakistan’s government and
its bar to take lessons from the recent history of Arab legal reform. See infra text accompanying
notes 155–59. It is thus likely that Cornelius received the Majalla from someone who was aware
of Cornelius’s interest in Arab legal reform and wanted to inform him about its deeper history.
117. See, e.g., A.R. Cornelius, Introduction of Islamic Law Principles into Statutory Structure
of Pakistan, Speech at Pakistan Legal Aid Society Meeting (Mar. 12, 1964), in CORNELIUS, supra
note 6, at 384 (arguing that based on the experience of Middle Eastern lawyers, Pakistani lawyers
should be able to help legislators develop “Islamic” versions of existing laws that would leave
intact the current practice of the courts). For other examples, see the discussion below.
118. Lombardi, supra note 4, at 69–72.
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independence to Egypt, Egyptians began to debate the possible reform of
the Egyptian legal system. One of the burning questions was whether Egypt
should try to return to some form of “Islamic” legal system.119 Secularists
debated with Islamists about whether Egypt should try to apply some form
of “Islamic” law. Islamists, in turn, debated among themselves about what a
new “Islamic” state should look like.120 As would later be the case in Pakistan, Islamist factions were divided between traditionalist Islamists who followed interpretations of Islam established by classically trained scholars
and lay Islamists who believed that Muslims without classical training
could be trusted to discern “Islamic” law from un-Islamic law. Among the
latter were leading members of Egypt’s most powerful lay Islamist party,
the Muslim Brotherhood.121
In this fractured political environment, an idiosyncratic member of the
Europeanized elite, Abdel Razzaq al-Sanhūrı̄, proposed a grand bargain.122
A brilliant comparative lawyer, Sanhūrı̄ had completed a Ph.D. in France.
During his studies, he had become familiar with (and sympathetic to) some
leaders of the “social law” movement then becoming influential among
progressives in both the common law and civil law worlds.123 Sanhūrı̄ was
also an Islamic modernist. In his French Ph.D. dissertation,124 he had proposed a novel method of Islamic legal interpretation that could be used by
legal professionals as well as classically trained scholars.125 He had then, in
119. For a description of the environment, see GUY BECHOR, THE SANHURĪ CODE AND THE
EMERGENCE OF MODERN ARAB CIVIL LAW (1932 TO 1949) 21–26 (Ruud Peters & A. Kevin
Reinhart eds., 2007).
120. For an analysis of these debates, see LOMBARDI, supra note 4, at 116–18.
121. Id. at 118.
122. For a biography of Sanhūrı̄, see generally ENID HILL, AL-SANHŪRĪ AND ISLAMIC LAW
(1987), reprinted as Al-Sanhuri and Islamic Law: The Place and Significance of Islamic Law in
the Life and Work of ‘Abd al-Razzaq Ahmad al-Sanhuri, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar, 1895-1971,
Part I, 3 ARAB L. Q. 33 (1988), Part II, 3 ARAB L. Q. 182 (1988). Other discussions appear in
FARHAT J. ZIADEH, LAWYERS, THE RULE OF LAW AND LIBERALISM IN MODERN EGYPT 136–60
(Hoover Inst. on War, Revolution and Peace ed., 1968). Recently, two scholars have uncovered
previously unexplored sources, including Sanhūrı̄’s journals, and have explored in more detail
than previous scholars the relationship of Sanhūrı̄ with progressive European and American legal
thinkers. See BECHOR, supra note 119; Amr Shalakany, Between Identity and Redistribution:
Sanhūri, Geneaology and the Will to Islamise, 8 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 201 (2001).
123. See generally BECHOR, supra note 119; Shalakany, supra note 122.
124. Subsequently published as ABD AL-RAZZĀQ AL-SANHŪRĪ, LE CALIFAT (1926).
125. The method was first articulated in SANHŪRĪ, supra note 124, at 570–81 and later elaborated in Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrı̄, Le droit musulman comme élément de refonte du code civil
égyptien, 3 RECUIL D’ÉTUDES EN L’HONNEUR D’ÉDOUARD LAMBERT, 3 (Paris: L.G.D.J, 1938),
621–42. For works in which he actually employed his method of Islamic legal reasoning to identify what he saw as the core principles of Islamic law, see, for example, Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhūrı̄,
La responsabilité civile et pénale en droit musulman, 15 MAJALLAT AL-QANUN WA AL-IQTISAD 1
(1945), and ABD AL-RAZZAQ AL-SANHŪRĪ, MASĀDIR AL-HAQQ FĪ AL-FIQH AL-ISLĀMĪ (1956). For a
discussion of Sanhūrı̄’s approach to Islamic legal interpretation, see LOMBARDI, supra note 4, at
92–99. For different analyses of his approach, see, for example, HILL, supra note 122, at 45–51,
and Shalakany, supra note 122, at 228–33. The one found in BECHOR, supra note 119, at 75–89,
strikes me as problematic.
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his dissertation, argued that Muslims could accept modern “Islamic” governments that would ally themselves under the aegis of an Islamic League
of Nations, and would apply newly re-imagined and progressive forms of
“Islamic” law.126
Upon his return from France, Sanhūrı̄ taught at Cairo University Law
School and eventually became its Dean.127 Like many legal professionals
he also became active in politics.128 His progressive political and economic
views alienated many of Egypt’s elites.129 Sanhūrı̄ knew, however, that they
were more afraid of populist Islamists than they were of him.130 In a series
of speeches and articles, Sanhūrı̄ played on fears of Islamist unrest in order
to get the elites to accept progressive legal reform.
Sanhūrı̄ convinced the Egyptian parliament that it should commission
him to revise the Egyptian civil code, promising that his Code would retain
much of the current legal system and yet would be accepted by the public as
Islamic.131 In drafting the new Code, he reviewed the existing code and
kept the rules that could be justified as both progressive and “Islamic” (according to the modernist method he had developed in his dissertation).
Sanhūrı̄ also borrowed from the legal codes of successful European states’
rules that (according to his interpretation of Islamic law) were consistent
with principles of justice common to both the European and Islamic traditions.132 In order to ensure that the Code remained flexible enough to adapt
to evolving circumstances, he deliberately left some areas of life to be regulated by judge-made law. Judges were instructed to fill in “gaps” in the

126. See generally SANHŪRĪ, supra note 125. For a summary of the work, see, for example,
HILL, supra note 122, at 44–51, and Shalakany, supra note 122, at 211–15.
127. HILL, supra note 122, at 36.
128. On this trend and Sanhūrı̄’s trajectory within it, see id. at 42–43, 53–64.
129. In a recent study of Sanhūrı̄’s private journals, his scholarly articles, and his legal drafting, Guy Bechor has eloquently described Sanhūrı̄’s frustration with Egypt’s political and economic elites—and, in particular, with their unwillingness to adopt progressive legislation of the
type then being developed by European jurists such as Roscoe Pound, legislation that would have
harmed their economic interests. See BECHOR, supra note 119, at 94–97. To Sanhūrı̄’s mind, elites
would only make significant legislative compromises if they felt it was necessary to avoid destabilizing social unrest. See LOMBARDI, supra note 4, at 25, 32–35.
130. For an overview of the broader political environment during the time Sanhūrı̄ was seeking an assignment to draft the new Egyptian Civil Code, see LOMBARDI, supra note 4, at 101–10.
131. Sanhūrı̄ argued that even if many Islamists championed an illiberal vision of Islam, the
public was prepared to recognize a liberal, modern body of law as “Islamic”: “We should not be
led astray by this superficial argument leveled from some quarters against the Islamic Sharı̄ `a, as
though it is unfit and frozen, since this is an erroneous theory. The Islamic Sharı̄ `a has developed
greatly, and may still develop in order to adapt to existing civilization.” Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhūri,
Wujūb Tanqı̄h al-Qānūn al-Madanı̄ al-Misrı̄ wa Àala ‘Ay Asā Yakūn Hadha al-Tanqı̄h, in 6
Majallat al-Qānūn wa-al-Iqtisād 114 (1936), translated in BECHOR, supra note 119, at 49–50. See
also id. at 87–89.
132. See ABD AL-RAZZAQ AL-SANHŪRĪ, 1 AL-WASĪT 61 (1988); BECHOR, supra note 119, at
88.
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Code by creating new rules consistent with both “Islamic” principles and
with justice.133
The Code contained many rules that were found in European codes of
law and many rules that progressive European jurists would have been
happy to include in European codes of law. After completing his Code in
1942, Sanhūrı̄ spent years trying to convince the public that such a collection of rules could be conceptualized as “Islamic.”134 After spirited public
debate with both traditionalist clerics and representatives of the Muslim
Brotherhood, Sanhūrı̄ convinced the parliament that his Code was consistent with core Islamic principles and indeed had a good argument that it was
more consistent with these principles than the far more radical codes being
championed by traditionalist clerics. More important, he convinced the parliament that the polity was ready to accept his Code as “Islamic.”135 In
1949, the Code was adopted.136
Sanhūrı̄ never convinced all Egyptians to recognize his Code as an
“Islamic” one.137 However, he convinced many, and once the Code proved
effective and popular, much of the remaining Islamist opposition to the
Code dissipated. Islamists continued to call for changes focused on a few
provisions, such as those permitting creditors to charge interest.138 By and
large, however, Islamist groups that had initially criticized Sanhūrı̄’s Code
seemed to grow comfortable with the Code and more generally with the
idea that a code which shared rules with European codes could be accepted
as legitimately Islamic. They also came to accept that judges without classi-

133. See Shalakany, supra note 122, at 233–35. Hill suggests that Sanhūrı̄’s interest in this
subject dates back to his graduate research while in France into the history of English law. See
HILL, supra note 122, at 44.
134. See HILL, supra note 122, at 182–84; Shalakany, supra note 122, at 218–19.
135. See BECHOR, supra note 119, at 87; HILL, supra note 122, at 182–84; ZIADEH, supra note
122, at 135–47; Shalakany, supra note 122, at 226–28.
136. See LOMBARDI, supra note 4, at 108–10; ZIADEH, supra note 122, at 143 (citing alMuhamah, Mar. 1948); see also BECHOR, supra note 119, at 87 (citing Sanhūrı̄, Al-Qanun al
Madani, Majmū`at al ‘A`māl al-Tahdiriyya, vol. 1 (Cairo: Matbat al Kitāb al`Arabı̄, 1949)).
137. Intriguingly, another group that he had trouble convincing was European academics. See,
most notably, J.N.D. Anderson, The Sharià and Civil Law, 1 ISLAMIC Q. 29 (1954); see also, N.J.
COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 153 (1964); Joseph Schacht, Problems of Modern Islamic
Legislation, 12 STUDIA ISLAMICA 99, 122 (1960).
138. See, e.g., Bruce K. Rutherford, The Struggle for Constitutionalism in Egypt: Understanding the Obstacles to Democratic Transition in the Arab World 327 (May 1999) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Yale University) (on file with the Yale University Library) translating portions of
ABD AL-QADIR AWDA’, AL-ISALM BAYN JAHL IBNA’IHI WA `AJZ ULAMA’IHI 36 (1951). Rutherford
translates passages from an important work in which Awda’, the Muslm Brotherhood’s chief
ideologue (who was soon to be executed by the Egyptian Government) opined that “most of
Egypt’s codes are compatible with Shari`a.” Those that permitted adultery and the drinking of
alcohol were the only clear exceptions. He did not even mention the laws permitting interest,
showing that even this became controversial only later after the rise of Islamic finance in the
1970s.
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cal training could be trusted to interpret Islamic law for the purpose of filling in gaps in “Islamic” statutes.139
Sanhūrı̄ and other liberal modernist Arab legal writers in Egypt and
abroad celebrated the success of the Code and proselytized throughout the
Muslim world for Sanhūrı̄’s project of re-conceptualizing in Islamic terms
those modern institutions and rules that had proved effective in Europe. The
commentary of such thinkers helped to shape many Arabs’ understanding
of Islamic law.140 Indeed, Islamists began to incorporate aspects of
Sanhūrı̄’s method into their own ongoing interpretation of Islamic law.141
Among the influential champions of Sanhūrı̄’s project was the Lebanese
lawyer Sobhi Mahmassani, a thinker whom Cornelius was reading as early
as 1964 and citing in his speeches.142 The proselytization was effective. In
short order, numerous post-colonial Arab states struggling to legitimize an
inherited legal order also decided to adopt versions of the Sanhūrı̄ Code.143
Bechor comments, “[I]t is impossible to relate to civil law in the Arab
world without an acquaintance with the New Egyptian Civil Code.”144
In the early 1960s, many in the Arab world believed that the spread of
Sanhūrı̄ Codes demonstrated the following core point: rules developed in
European countries and imported into Muslim countries by colonial powers
could be re-conceptualized as rules consistent with core Islamic principles.
By 1964, Cornelius had begun to talk about recent Arab legal reform with
Arab judges and had read Mahmassani—the only leading Arab champion of
139. At the time of its adoption, Sanhūrı̄’s code had been controversial among both Egypt’s
classically trained religious scholars based at al-Azhar and Egypt’s most powerful law Islamists,
most of whom were members of the Muslim Brotherhood. When these figures re-emerged in the
1970s as potent political forces in Egypt, they demanded “Islamic” reforms to Egypt’s laws.
Amazingly, at this point, they demanded almost no changes to Sanhūrı̄’s Egyptian Civil Code—
explicitly stating that most of its provisions were consistent with Islamic law. They demanded,
instead, changes to the laws of personal status and criminal codes.
140. As Baber Johansen has pointed out: “Even the Islamicist movement of the late eighties
and nineties who often criticize Sanhūrı̄’s or Chehata’s conceptions do apply their methods,
mostly with much less skill, when they produce projects of new codes.” BABER JOHANSEN, CONTINGENCY IN A SACRED LAW 59 (Ruud Peters & Bernard Weiss eds., 1999). See generally Lombardi & Brown, supra note 4, at 433–34 (discussing how the Supreme Constitutional Court of
Egypt’s interpretation of Islamic law draws heavily upon Sanhūrı̄’s theories, among others, and
has been accepted by the public as appropriate).
141. JOHANSEN, supra note 140, at 59. See also, generally, Lombardi & Brown, supra note 4,
at 433–34.
142. A.R. Cornelius, Speech at Pakistan Legal Aid Society Meeting, in CORNELIUS, supra note
6, at 381.
143. On the influence of the code, see generally BECHOR, supra note 119, at 57 (listing the
countries that adopted Sanhūrı̄ codes) and Nabil Saleh, Civil Codes of Arab Countries: The
Sanhūrı̄ Codes, 8 ARAB L. Q. 161 (1993). Syria adopted a version in 1949, and Libya followed
suit in 1953. Sanhūrı̄ drafted the 1951 Iraqi civil code modifying (and, he thought, improving
upon) his Egyptian Code. The Egyptian Civil Code indirectly influenced numerous other codes,
serving as “the principal basis of reference” for the civil codes of Jordan (1976), Yemen (1979),
and Kuwait (1981). Id.
144. BECHOR, supra note 119, at 57.
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“liberal Islam” whose work had been translated into English.145 In
speeches, he began to cite the recent history of Arab legal reform (and the
writings of Mahmassani) to support his claim that in countries where Islamist pressure was strong, liberal legal professionals with proper training
and drive could build popular support for progressive legal rules. To do so,
they would have to reconceptualize those rules in Islamic terms as rules
consistent with core Islamic principles and then “sell” their interpretation of
Islamic law to the public.
IV. CORNELIUS’S ARGUMENT FOR LAWYER-LED
ISLAMIZATION IN PAKISTAN
In 1962, Cornelius began explicitly to argue that the only hope for a
re-empowerment of the judiciary and the legal profession and the re-establishment of liberal constitutionalism would come through liberal Islamization. Pakistani liberals, particularly those in the legal profession, should
engage in a two-part program. First, they should use their institutional prestige to support Islamization by arguing that it was only through Islamization
that a stable legal order could emerge. At the same time, they should establish themselves as legitimate interpreters of Islamic law and establish fundamental rights principles as essential principles of Islamic law.
Cornelius unveiled his new thinking in a daring fashion in 1962 when,
as Chief Justice, he was asked to address a hostile military command at its
headquarters in Rawalpindi. In his speech, Cornelius urged the military to
commit itself to respecting the fundamental wishes of the people—including respect for their fundamental rights and Pakistani law that is demonstrably consistent with Islamic law.146
Cornelius suggested to the assembled officers that unless the new
Pakistani Constitution reflected the fundamental moral beliefs of the people, the Constitution, the laws created pursuant to the Constitution, and the
orders of courts administering these laws were all likely to be viewed as
illegitimate. The people, he implied, would disobey them whenever they
could. Asking the assembled officers to reflect on their own attitudes towards “law,” he pointed out that laws perceived as illegitimate tend to be
disobeyed whenever the people can get away with disobedience.147 If a con145. Sanhūrı̄ and Chehata wrote in Arabic and French. An important treatise of Mahmasani’s
was translated in 1961 into English. See SOBHI MAHMASSANI, FALSAFAT AL-TASHRĪ‘ FĪ AL-ISLĀM
[THE PHILOSOPHY OF JURISPRUDENCE IN ISLAM] (Farhat Ziadeh trans., 1961). It is this version that
Cornelius seems to have read and referred to.
146. A.R. Cornelius, Address to Officers of the Pakistan Army at General Headquarters in
Rawalpindi (July 11, 1962), in CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at 201. This was a speech that he would
regularly refer back to in later speeches. See, e.g., A.R. Cornelius, Crime and Punishment of
Crime, Speech to the Third Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference (Aug. 27, 1965) in
CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at 80.
147. A.R. Cornelius, Address to Officers of the Pakistan Army at General Headquarters in
Rawalpindi, in CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at 201 (“The mere fact that cases are decided does not
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stitution does not include a mechanism to ensure that laws are perceived as
legitimate, social stability and public order are threatened and the nation
may ultimately become ungovernable. “The machinery of popular representation, the technique of law-making, all the familiar activities of politicians
have come to be understood as mere motions in a foreign mode. The more
vigorously they are pursued, the nearer the infant State is brought to the
point of dissolution.”148
What was to be done? Drawing upon the writings of another Catholic,
Simone Weil, Cornelius argued that after conquering a country, a military
could only establish the legitimacy of its rule (and that of its successors) by
demonstrating respect for the contractual nature of effective governance.
The men who offer their service to the country to govern it will
have to publicly recognize certain obligations corresponding to
essential aspirations of the people eternally inscribed in the depths
of popular feeling; the people must have confidence in the work
and in the capacity of these men, and be provided with means of
expressing the fact; they must also be made to feel that, in accepting these men, they give an undertaking to obey them.149
In Pakistan, Cornelius said, this principle would require the new military government to establish a regime that respected the people’s commitment to Islamic law.150 Although the people disagreed about what Islam
required, they insisted that the government demonstrate a good faith attempt
to comply with God’s law. It was thus a matter of “political therapeutics”151
that the military government demonstrate its good faith by recognizing the
authority of independent judges and instruct them to issue orders consistent
with Islamic law. Legitimacy will come only after a
search for the true roots of the nation’s being, and following immediately after, there must be restoration of local liberties and
powers, as nearly as possible on traditional lines, so that the national character may be rebuilt, in an atmosphere of freedom,
under the age-old incentives and controls. The most important of
these [restored] powers, in my opinion, is the judicial power. . . .
necessarily mean that the system followed is fully adapted to the understanding and sentiment of
the people. We all know of civil cases where after getting a decision from the final Court, the
parties have to go home and make a compromise so as to produce a practical result more in
consonance with what they know to be the natural justice of the matter.”).
148. Id. at 218.
149. Id. at 219–20 (“The point is put very clearly by a notable French woman writer, Simone
Weil, in a book entitled The Need for Roots, written during the years 1940-45 when France lay
under German occupation. . . . This is what she has to say: ‘Seeing that we have, in fact, recently
experienced a break in historical continuity, constitutional legality can no longer be regarded as
having an historical basis; it must be made to derive from the eternal source of all legality.’”).
150. Id. at 219 (“It is in this sense that the demand often heard in Pakistan, for restoration of
traditional Islamic institutions should be understood. It is the natural cry of a strong organism to
be connected once again with its original and proper roots. The matter lies in the field of political
therapeutics.”).
151. Id.
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It is necessary only to re-devise for them [in Islamic terms] the
basic principles and procedures of the laws they administer. This
is a matter of fundamental importance.152
If the assembled military officers wondered why this Cambridge-educated, Catholic liberal champion of natural rights was developing a strategy
by which a military government could legitimize its rule through a process
of Islamization, it soon became clear. In his speech to the military, Cornelius did not discuss the content of the law that would be equally applied. In
speeches to other less dangerous audiences, however, he made clear that
this law should enshrine liberal values that would place limits on executive
discretion.
In that same year, 1962, Cornelius gave a speech to Pakistan’s national
bar association, which was made up primarily of Anglophone secular members of Pakistan’s middle class.153 In it, he argued that it was counterproductive for lawyers to ignore the popular calls for Islamization even if
they found most Islamists’ understanding of Islamic law to be repugnant.
Repeating the point that he made to the military, Cornelius contended that,
like it or not, Pakistanis would only respect a body of law that was understood to be “Islamic”:
There is great weight in the popular demand to bring all laws into
conformity with the dictates of religion. Whatever immediate
form the demand may take, and from whatever angle it may be
represented, it represents the feeling of a people who are seeking
to shape their lives according to Quran and Sunnah. We cannot
take refuge behind the argument that the people are already
equipped with a thorough complex of laws under which they have
lived successfully for many decades. It is not enough to point out
that these laws are in line with the laws prevailing in advanced
countries. In many essential respects, the Western pattern of laws
shows fundamental differences from those which arise out of the
great civilizations and religions of the Middle East. It is to those
cultures that the people of Pakistan owe allegiance. Until the essence of laws to which those cultures have given rise is assimilated into the legal structure of our country, there will be no
cessation of this demand.154
Cornelius recalled the futility with which the British government tried
to end, by force alone, the practice of honor killing in rural Pakistan.
Whatever Cornelius’s views on the morality of honor killing, he came to
feel that it was foolish to believe one could simply legislate it out of existence. When a government criminalized acts that “are esteemed among the
highest in their community,” it inspired disrespect for both the law and for
152. Id. at 220.
153. A.R. Cornelius, Integration of Nation Through Law, Presidential Address at the All-Pakistan Lawyers’ Convention (Dec. 23, 1962), in CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at 57.
154. Id. at 58.
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judicial orders that applied the law. Ultimately, “[t]his type of capital punishment [has been] administered for over a century. It has not resulted in the
diminution of intensity of the sentiments with which the code of honour is
maintained. On the contrary, it is the deterrent effect of the death sentence
which has been dulled.”155
If the state did not Islamize its law, then the law was likely to lose its
authority, as would the lawyers and judges who were specialists in the law.
Disorder would likely result. If the state did Islamize the law, then one
might see the re-establishment of at least the thin rule of law, where the
citizenry and the government all respected “the law” as articulated in written laws and elaborated by judges:
The people will regard their laws with respect, and will implement them in their lives with honesty and reverence only when
they come to recognize the laws as deriving from a true source of
Sovereignty. . . . If that ideal is achieved, the laws would have a
natural force to project and sustain them in the same way as principles are maintained and universally accepted. It will become
the delight of the community to live according to their laws.156
But what would the content of this new, “Islamized” law be? Cornelius
suggested that it was still evolving and could develop in a liberal fashion.
Pakistanis were vigorously debating basic questions of Islamic legal authority, Islamic interpretive theory, and, thus, questions of Islamic law. If lawyers took the initiative to engage in Islamic debate, they would be able to
influence the public’s understanding of Islamic law, making the changes
less wrenching. To support this claim, Cornelius directed his audience’s
attention to the recent experience of Arab countries, many of which had (or
would soon) adopt Sanhūrı̄ Codes:
I would particularly recommend the study of the historical development and the present condition of the principal laws in force in
Middle Eastern countries, in Egypt and in North Africa. It is not
generally known that the Codes there prevalent, while based on
true Muslim legal concepts, and being fully adapted to the Muslim way of life, are also steadily assuming a modern form suitable
for communities which are emerging into the world of today.
Studies of this kind would serve to provide the basis upon which
concepts of Middle Eastern fundamental law, being well-adapted
to the culture and sentiments of our people, could be built into the
structure of our laws, in replacement of English Common Law
principles.157
Lawyers and judges would be able to influence people’s views about
what Islamic law required. They did not, however, have infinite ability to
155. Id. at 59.
156. Id. at 62.
157. Id.
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do so. Cornelius admitted that in harmonizing the state’s official version of
Islamic law with modern economies and with the liberal norms to which
most judges were personally committed, they would be constrained by
deeply embedded cultural assumptions about what God had commanded—
assumptions which could evolve only slowly.
Cornelius thus urged lawyers to accept that a good faith program of
Islamization might require some reforms that they would find personally
distasteful. For example, Cornelius suggested that if the assembled members of the Bar really wished to re-establish the primacy of law, they should
argue for a reform of the criminal codes.158 Specifically, they should push
for abolition of the death penalty in cases of “honor killings”—homicides
carried out to uphold traditional notion of family “honor”—that the masses
(rightly or wrongly) considered to be grounded in Islam.159 In later
speeches, Cornelius also controversially pushed for greater recognition, in
certain areas, of traditional modes of dispute resolution—notably, under
some circumstances at least, the traditional Pushtun jirga.160 He created an
international uproar in Australia161 when, at a conference of commonwealth
judges, he stated that he could imagine circumstances under which traditional Islamic punishment, including amputation, might be seen as no more
cruel than traditional British punishments for the same crime.162
Some liberal lawyers and jurists found Cornelius’s position to be ill
considered—arguing that it tried to impose a “rule of law” without asking if
that rule of law might not be worse than autocracy.163 But such criticisms
were unfair. Cornelius had indeed thought about this. He argued that concessions to popular understandings of Islam were generally no more offensive to basic morality than concessions that the common law already made
to reflect the realities of human behavior.
With respect to honor killings, Cornelius pointed out, British criminal
law already recognized mitigation of punishment for certain reasons, including temporary insanity. As he saw it, social pressures were such that, in
158. Id. at 59.
159. Id. at 62.
160. A.R. Cornelius, Speech to the Third Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference, in
CORNELIUS, surpa note 6, at 261–68.
161. See An Account of the Third Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference Held in Sydney, Australia from 25 August to 1 September 1965, PLD 1965 Journal, 172–78. For a discussion
of this piece and an explanation of its authorship, see BRAIBANTI, supra note 6, at 35–36, 76 n.53.
162. A.R. Cornelius, Speech to the Third Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference, in
CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at 268–71.
163. For a discussion of the criticisms of Cornelius by Justice Kayani (co-author of THE
MUNIR REPORT) and I.A. Khan, see CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at 46–47. Some Pakistani intellectuals still are skeptical. A few years ago, a conversation with an older secularist Pakistani intellectual turned to the subject of Justice Cornelius. My interlocutor remembered the Justice Cornelius
well, he said: “But which one are we talking about?” he asked with a smile. “The liberal hero? Or
Justice Chop-off-the-Hand?” Private Conversation Between the Author and a Pakistani Who
Wishes to Remain Anonymous (Feb. 2008).
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some parts of Pakistan, people might reasonably be expected to be driven to
homicide by overwhelming, culturally reinforced social shame. Mitigating
punishment for a person who carried out an honor killing was thus analogous, he argued, to the British refusing to put to death people who killed
when overcome by what the British called “temporary insanity.”164 Similarly, Cornelius’s support for amputation was conditioned on a Panglossian
assumption that doctors, if they put their mind to it, would be able to preserve and reattach amputated body parts.165 In other words, he supported
amputation insofar as it would be temporary. As Cornelius saw it, instead of
temporarily losing his liberty, a person convicted of theft in a modern Islamic state would temporarily lose his hand, which could be reattached after
a period of time.166 His defense of the jirga was also qualified. Indeed, in
some ways, it anticipates the analysis that mainstream American think tanks
have recently employed to argue that limited recognition of jirgas would
help improve efficiency and trust in the legal system of post-conflict Afghanistan.167 For Cornelius, then, the imposition of Islamic law would require changes that might be uncomfortable but did not cut into the core
values promoted by the common law legal system. At the same time, Islamic law allowed for the re-establishment of core principles of common
law justice that secular dictators had recently cast aside and were unlikely
to be re-established under any government committed to secularism.
As Cornelius saw it, the people demanded Islamization. As a result,
any government that wished to apply only secular law would have to resort
to denying the popular will and, likely, suppressing dissent. Secularist government in Pakistan was doomed to be undemocratic and likely to devalue
natural rights. Conversely, Cornelius believed that if they devoted themselves to the task, liberal lawyers and judges would be able to argue convincingly that Islamic law demanded respect for fundamental liberal
principles. This point, already implicit in Cornelius’s 1962 speeches, was
made explicit in numerous later ones. In a 1964 speech, he cited Iqbal, one
of the modern Islamic thinkers most revered among Pakistanis for the proposition that a “republican form of government” was “not only thoroughly
consistent with the Spirit of Islam, but also with the new forces that are set
164. See A.R. Cornelius, Presidential Address at the All-Pakistan Lawyers’ Convention, in
CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at 59; see also A.R. Cornelius, Speech to the Third Commonwealth and
Empire Law Conference, in CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at 254–57, for a much more elaborate
treatment of the issue.
165. A.R. Cornelius, Speech to the Third Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference, in
CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at 269–70.
166. See id.; see also BRAIBANTI, supra note 6, at 35–36, for Prof. Braibanti’s recollections of
a discussion he had with Cornelius on this subject.
167. See, e.g., THOMAS BARFIELD, NEAMAT NOJUMI & ALEX THEIR, U.S. INST. FOR PEACE,
THE CLASH OF TWO GOODS: STATE AND NON-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN
(2006), http://www.usip.org/files/file/clash_two_goods.pdf; JOHN DEMPSEY & NOAH COBURN,
U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, TRADITIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN
(2010), http://www.usip.org/resources/traditional-dispute-resolution-and-stability-in-afghanistan.
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free in the word of Islam.”168 In another speech, he discussed the classical
Islamic legal and political thinkers Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Rushd,
and concluded:
It is remarkable that of these great thinkers, the two latter had
absorbed to the full all that was of meaning and excellence in the
Platonic philosophy, on which our modern concepts of democracy
are based, but nevertheless they adhered to the view that the integrity of the Muslim State is bound up with adherence to the
Shariah.169
In yet another speech, Cornelius insisted that Islamic law could be interpreted to command respect by the government for all of the natural rights
revered by liberal common law thinkers.170
In short, Islamization, and only Islamization, left open the possibility
that Pakistan could re-establish a judicially-supervised and at least partially
liberal democracy. Islamization carried risks and would certainly require
non-trivial concessions to illiberal popular beliefs about God’s command.
Nevertheless, it would leave lawyers considerable power to shape people’s
understanding of what Islamic law required. If they pushed for Islamization
and, at the same time, promoted a liberal interpretation of Islamic law, liberal judges and lawyers might produce in Pakistan a modified, but recognizably liberal, version of the rule of law.171
The new Constitution in its Preamble declares that sovereignty
over the entire Universe vests in Almighty Allah alone, and that
Pakistan is to be a democratic State based on Islamic principles of
social justice. The lawyers of Pakistan are capable of giving a
practical shape to these high principles with the aid of their
knowledge and study. The people will regard their laws with respect, and will implement them in their lives with honesty and
reverence only when they come to recognize the laws as deriving
from a true source of Sovereignty [i.e., Islam]. . . . If that ideal is
achieved the laws would have a natural force to project and sustain them in the same way as principles are maintained and universally accepted. It will become the delight of the community to
live according to their laws.172
From 1964 on, Cornelius continued relentlessly to stress three themes.
First, Pakistanis had demonstrated a fundamental desire for the law to be
168. A.R. Cornelius, Iqbal’s Political Message, Speech at the University of the Punjab (Apr.
21, 1964), in CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at 374.
169. A.R. Cornelius, Function of Law as a Link Between Nations, in CORNELIUS, supra note 6,
at 149.
170. A.R. Cornelius, Leadership Needs to Promote the Ethos of the Constitution, Speech at
the Hyderabad Rotary Club in Hyderabad, India (Feb. 13, 1965), in CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at
215.
171. See A.R. Cornelius, Integration of Nation Through Law, in CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at
57.
172. Id. at 62.
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Islamic. The only way to suppress this was to impose an authoritarian regime that repudiated the liberal tradition that liberals and much of the legal
profession claimed to hold dear. For example, in a 1964 speech at the prestigious University of the Punjab, Cornelius reminded his audience that postcolonial governments all over the world were failing to honor the liberal
rule of law.173 This concern haunted many of his speeches.
Second, Pakistan’s Islamists did not all demand that the state incorporate an interpretation of law developed by classical scholars. Lay Islamists,
like Mawdudi, explicitly recognized the ability of people without classical
training to interpret the law. The recent history of the Middle East also
suggested that the public would accept thoughtful and informed interpretations of Islam produced by lawyers with secular “legal” training, rather than
muftis with classical Islamic training. In a 1964 speech to the Pakistan Legal Aid Society, Cornelius stressed:174
I take it for granted that none of the audience present here would
wish that the system of justice that we follow here should be altered in such a way that we should go back to the ancient practice
of having Juris Consult, have persons to whom we could go for
fatwas and decide cases like that. I think the people are now,
through nearly two centuries of acquaintance with the British
mode, absolutely accustomed to a system in which there are three
tiers [of courts: trial, appellate, and final appellate] . . . Neither the
people nor the lawyers would ever wish that our system as we
practise it today should be altered. But the people may also wish
that the Courts constituted as they are today should be applying in
everything that they do, the law according to the Quran and the
Sunnah—as required by the Constitution.175
In another speech, Cornelius elaborated on his ideal of preserving both
the essentials of the existing legal system and the public recognition of the
law as “Islamic”:
In our own State, I hope there will be none to deny that sovereignty lies in the law and the Constitution, and while administration is for the Executive, and law-making for the legislature, yet
what is constitutional and legal, and what is not, should be declared in independence, bearing in mind only the high interests of
the State, by the Courts alone.176
Legal professionals could be given training in the Islamic tradition so
that they can dispute credibly with madrasa-trained Islamic scholars and
173.
174.
stan, in
175.
176.
at 147.

A.R. Cornelius, Iqbal’s Political Message, in CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at 374.
A.R. Corneilus, Introduction of Islamic Law Principles into Statutory Structure of PakiCORNELIUS, supra note 6, at 384.
Id. at 381–82.
A.R. Cornelius, Function of Law as a Link Between Nations, in CORNELIUS, supra note 6,
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win support not only for lay interpretations but for liberal lay interpretations
of Islam:
In our Universities there should be set up an Honours School of
Islamic Jurisprudence where the instruction would be at an extremely high level. It should be different from what is taught in
our Law Schools today, which are practically nothing more than
technical schools enabling persons to gain entry to Courts and
make a living.177
Third, the history of law reform in Arab countries suggested that if
lawyers showed good faith and training, they could successfully articulate
an argument for liberal legality in an “Islamic” mode. In a 1964 speech,178
Cornelius cited Mahmassani for the proposition that people who favored the
liberal rule of law must be prepared to reconceptualize it in a way that took
account of core Islamic beliefs while harmonizing them with core liberal
values.179 If they were willing to do this, he insisted, they had the ability to
build a thickly liberal system that would maintain the core features of British constitutionalism and also command the obedience of both the ruler and
the ruled. In another speech to an audience of political scientists, Cornelius
optimistically put it this way: if lawyers took the time to express, as they
clearly could, the genius of liberal democracy in Islamic terms, then
enlightenment would follow and thus the way of appreciation and
adoption of the basic norms which are the requisite of our Constitution will be cleared and made to appear easy. . . . Where [the]
law has grown out of the religious consciousness of the peoples, a
tie would emerge which no one could possibly break.180
Cornelius thus concluded that if the assembled lawyers wanted to reestablish the liberal rule of law, they could. To succeed, however, they
would have to be prepared to embark on a Sanhūrı̄-like exercise of re-casting the legal institutions and principles they admired in an Islamic
language:
[D]emocracy in Islam can never be merely secular but is essentially an exercise in the organisation of the people in accordance
with the fundamental beliefs of their faith. That by itself will
furnish the necessary incentive to the people to be true to the dictates of the Constitution and the laws under which they live, in the
hope of an eternal reward.181
177. CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at 384.
178. Id. at 381.
179. Id. at 383 (“[Islamic] jurists and philosophers alike, however varied their conclusion
might be in regard to matters of political philosophy or even the structure of the State at the
highest level, nevertheless repeatedly return to the norm or ultimate measure of the Sharia for
whatever they say.”).
180. A.R. Cornelius, Function of Law as a Link Between Nations, in CORNELIUS, supra note 6,
at 147.
181. A.R. Cornelius, Iqbal’s Political Message, in CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at 374.
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In 1964, some began to suggest that Cornelius’s radical argument for
Islamization was superfluous. In that year, the government amended the
Constitution to make fundamental rights justiciable—thus apparently recognizing the biding quality of natural rights. While Cornelius welcomed the
move, he was clearly skeptical about the government’s bona fides. Having
lived through the imposition of both emergency rule and martial law, he
was clearly concerned that respect for fundamental rights would cease
whenever the military found respect to be inconvenient.
Thus, even after these changes, Cornelius continued to argue that, in
Pakistan, judges would not be able to ensure ongoing respect for fundamental rights listed in the Constitution unless they could connect fundamental
rights to religious values shared by both the government and the governed.
By embedding rights principles in an “Islamized” legal discourse, judges
would be able to generate moral pressure on rulers to respect orders protecting citizens’ fundamental rights and force rulers to recognize the real risk of
popular outrage if rulers violated these orders:
[T]he Constitution lays down in the Fundamental Rights, the path
which leadership is to follow, the over-riding principles that are to
govern thought and behavior and policy. It is a misfortune that
these are expressed in terms derived from other Constitutions
which have been in existence for perhaps half a century. It may
be convenient for purposes of judicial interpretation that the expression should be in the English language, but from the point of
view of making these amendments a matter of conscience, would
there not be in Pakistan enormous advantage to be gained from
setting them out in a Scriptural language, that is in the Arabic
language? I conceive that each Fundamental Right can be shown
to derive from the dictates contained in the Holy Scriptures of
Islam. If expressed in Arabic, in suitable terms, would they not
be invested with overtones of undeniable obligation? Would not
their assimilation into the public conscience be vastly enhanced
thereby?182
Cornelius’s enthusiasm for liberal Islamization did not wane after he
left the bench. In 1969, after retiring from the Court, he was asked to teach
officers’ training for the Civil Service of Pakistan (the successor to the
ICS).183 He reflected upon the British ideal of the rule of law and insisted
that, paradoxically, no rule of law could be established in Pakistan unless
these principles were translated into an Islamic idiom:
182. A.R. Cornelius, Leadership Needs to Promote the Ethos of the Constitution, in CORNEsupra note 6, at 215.
183. For the relationship of the CSP to the ICS and the tensions it caused, see Garth Jones,
Pakistan: A Civil Service in an Obsolescing Imperial Tradition, 19 ASIAN J. PUB. ADMIN. 321
(1997), available at http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkjo/view/50/5000141.pdf. See also DAVID C.E.
CHEW, CIVIL SERVICE PAY IN SOUTH ASIA (1992).
LIUS,
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Reverting now to the proposition that an integrated idea of Right
or Law pervading the entire community is essential for the
healthy operation of a democratic society which observes the
Rule of Law, there is no escape from the conclusion that the Ethical System of Islam must provide the medium through which [in
Pakistan] the body of laws and institutions together with the
moral conscience of the citizens is to function.184
Cornelius’s commitment to this project was such that he continued until his death to study Arabic and Islamic law and to write works trying to
demonstrate points of continuity.185
Interestingly, over time, Cornelius came to frame the need for Islamization in Pakistan in terms of a broader global need. While international human rights documents drafted by Western democracies reflected
universally applicable principles, they were drafted in a language that made
them unrecognizable and arguably unattractive to the masses in many postcolonial countries. People around the world should strive to translate human
rights concepts into a form that resonated with the religious principles that
were revered by the majority of the people in a particular country. If they
did, the rulers would be more inclined to obey, and if they failed to, the
people would be more likely to hold them accountable:186
Organized and established religion, such as we are familiar with,
still remains the most powerful safeguard against man’s inhumanity to man. It is a question which I find of profound interest,
whether, if South Africa were to become a religious state, there
would not be that shift of opinion among the ruling class, who all
profess Christianity, in favor of free and equal treatment to the
underprivileged persons in their midst, which the recently reported resolution of the General Assembly seems scarcely capable of accomplishing.187

184. A.R. Cornelius, Judicial System of Pakistan, Speech at the National Institute of Public
Administration at Lahore (May 12, 1965), in CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at 274–75.
185. See A.R. Cornelius, The Concept of Islamic Justice, Speech (c. 1977), in BRAIBANTI,
supra note 6, at 297–314; A.R. Cornelius, Morals: The Islamic Approach (c. 1983), reprinted in
BRAIBANTI, supra note 6, at 315–31 (essay written for the Hamdard Foundation in Karachi). Braibanti reports that the latter essay was published in VOICE OF MORALITY 148–67 (Hakim Mohammad Said ed., 1985). Id. at 315.
186. A.R. Cornelius, Islam and Human Rights, Speech Delivered at the Pakistan Academy for
Rural Development, Peshwar (Nov. 8, 1977), in CORNELIUS, supra note 6, at 278–96 (“I submit
that this Universal Declaration is founded too exclusively on the concept of the secular state. . . .
[T]he future calls for a great deal of consideration whether this Declaration would not be more
effective over large parts of the earth’s surface, if it gave a real place to religion in its
formulation.”).
187. Id.
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MIGHT CORNELIUS HAVE BEEN ONTO SOMETHING? THE
AMBIGUITIES OF ISLAMIZATION IN PAKISTAN
IN THE 1970S, ’80S, AND ’90S.

A. R. Cornelius was a Catholic liberal jurist who had once found public discussions of Islam’s role in the state “repellent.” In the 1950s, however, Cornelius watched as Islamists demonstrated the popular appeal of
Islamic discourse. He drew from this a very different lesson than judicial
colleagues like Justice Munir and Justice Kayani. In the Munir Report,
Munir and Kayani suggested that Pakistan could not commit to Islamization
so long as its leading proponents were illiberal populists. This was true even
if a majority of Pakistanis demanded Islamization. Although they did not
say as much, they seemed to imply that, if necessary, secularists had the
right (and possibly at times the duty) to violate the fundamental civil rights
of citizens. Cornelius saw this as self-defeating. Munir’s opinions in Dosso
and Mehdi Ali Khan only confirmed him in this view. As he saw it, secularists had no liberal constitutionalist ideology that they could use to replace
the common law constitutionalism. When secularists rejected the idea that
the government was unconditionally bound to respect the settled expectations of the people, they left the government effectively unbounded. If lawyers wanted to maintain the liberal rule of law in an Islamizing world, they
should not reject their obligation to respect the people’s core demand for
Islamization. Rather, lawyers should try to influence people’s understanding of Islamic government and Islamic law. They should try to establish
judges in the popular mind as interpreters and elaborators of a liberal “Islamic” body of law—both a statutory law that they ensured was consistent
with Islamic principles and a body of judge-made law that represented a
judicial elaboration of Islamic principles. Cornelius was comfortable taking
this position in part because he had learned that liberal lawyers in the Arab
Middle East had established themselves as legitimate interpreters of Islamic
law and gained popular acceptance by Islamists for a body of “European”
law that they had reconceptualized in Islamic terms.
Cornelius’s proposal was nothing if not ambitious. He thought that legal professionals should take part in a systematic program to study Islamic
law and particularly to study liberal interpretations of Islamic law. They
should learn to articulate and proselytize for the values they cherished (efficient governance, protection of fundamental rights) in Islamic terms. They
should then use their knowledge of Pakistani law, where possible, to justify
existing laws in Islamic terms and, where not possible, to propose amendments to Pakistani law to ensure that it is recognized by the Public as consistent with Islamic law.
In promoting his vision, Cornelius freely admitted that he was optimistic about two issues. First, he was optimistic that liberal Pakistani legal
professionals would be willing to engage in a time-consuming process of
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legal re-conceptualization. Second, he was optimistic that these legal professionals would be able convincingly to connect liberal constitutional principles to Islamic principles and to develop “Islamic” justifications for the
enforcement of liberal rights.
Initially, most liberals overwhelmingly resisted Cornelius’s appeal on
behalf of Islamization. Even those who were distressed about the illiberal
direction that secularism had taken were skeptical about the idea that lawyers in Pakistan could win the public over to a liberal interpretation of Islamic law that would allow for a modern government and would serve as a
bulwark of traditional fundamental rights.188 They continued to accept the
position articulated by Munir and Kayani in the 1950s that Islamization
would never empower liberal Pakistani voices but, rather, would always
empower illiberal voices. Islamization, the skeptics believed, would always
tend to lead to a net loss of constitutional liberties.
At first glance skeptics might seem to have been proved right. During
a period of Islamization in the 1970s, a populist president, Zulficar Ali
Bhutto and, after him, a military dictator, Zia al-Haq, each cooperated with
reactionary elements in Pakistani society to impose some self-styled “Islamic statutes” that were profoundly illiberal.189 Amendments to the constitution empowered a special branch of courts to strike down laws on grounds
of repugnancy to Islam.190 A notorious statute declared the Ahmadi sect of
Islam to be un-Islamic,191 criminalized blasphemy,192 and imposed traditional Islamic punishments for fornication.193 Much of the commentary on
these statutes declares them to be disastrous from a human rights
perspective.194
188. See BRAIBANTI, supra note 6, at 46–47, for a description of criticisms leveled at Cornelius by Justice Kayani and I.A. Khan.
189. See, e.g., TALBOT, supra note 25, at 240, 270–83.
190. Id. at 273–74.
191. Ordinance XX: Anti-Islamic Activities of Quadiani Group, Lahori Group and Ahmadis
(Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance (1984), 36 PLD 102 (Pak.). For a discussion of this
ordinance and of court decisions upholding its constitutionality, see generally Tayyab Mahmud,
Freedom of Religion and Religious Minorities in Pakistan: A Study of Judicial Practice, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 40 (1995).
192. 295-C, Act XLV of 1860, PAK. PENAL CODE (1860), amended by The Criminal Law
(Amendment) Act, No. III of 1986, THE GAZETTE OF PAKISTAN EXTRAORDINARY (Oct. 12, 1986).
For critiques, see discussion in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PAKISTAN: USE AND ABUSE OF BLASPHEMY LAWS (1994) and Osama Siddique & Zahra Hayat, Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan—Controversial Origins, Design Defects, and Free Speech Implications,
17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 305 (2008).
193. Offense of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, No. VII of 1979, PAK. PENAL
CODE (1979), reprinted in 31 PLD (Statutes) 51 (Pak.).
194. See, e.g., ASMA JEHANGIR & HINA JILANI, THE HUDOOD ORDINACES: A DIVINE SANCTION? (1990); Rashida Patel, Islamization of Laws in Pakistan?, in ISLAMIC REASSERTION IN PAKISTAN (Anita Weiss ed., 1986); WOMEN OF PAKISTAN: TWO STEPS FORWARD AND ONE STEP BACK?
(Khawar Mumtaz & Farida Shaheed eds., 1987). But see for a contrasting view Charles Kennedy,
Islamization in Pakistan: Implementation of the Hudood Ordinances, 28 ASIAN SURV. 307,
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Even if, however, General Zia’s Islamization program and the legal
reforms incident to them had a detrimental effect on constitutional liberties
and women’s rights, this does not disprove Cornelius’s hypothesis. Cornelius always understood that Islamization could take place in an illiberal
form and recognized as well that illiberal Islamization is precisely what
many in Pakistan hoped to see. He made only the narrow claims that (a)
liberal Islamization was a realistic possibility in Pakistan, (b) judges and
lawyers could, he believed, develop and proselytize for liberal interpretations of Islam, and (c) in Pakistan, a liberal Islamic regime was the only
type of liberal regime that could withstand the illiberal pressures generated
both by illiberal factions of secularists and illiberal factions of Islamists.
Recent studies suggest that if we understand his claim in these narrow
terms, Cornelius may, in fact, have been onto something. Although the elite
judiciary was initially hostile to Cornelius’s claims, some elite judges came
over time to believe that Cornelius was right. These judges eventually tried
to use liberal interpretations of Islamic law to promote the democracy and
the rule of law in Pakistan.
Islamization in Pakistan from the 1970s through the present day thus
turned out to be a multi-faceted process. General Zia’s promulgation of apparently illiberal “Islamic” constitutional amendments and statutes constituted one facet. Liberal judicial interpretation of these amendments and
statutes constituted another. As Charles Kennedy has shown, court records
suggest that some of Bhutto and Zia’s “Islamic” statutes had less of an
impact on people’s lives than critics claimed. This is apparently because
judges harnessed procedural safeguards to avoid implementation and also
employed progressive interpretations of Islamic law to give creative interpretations of the statutes and to limit the impact of the Islamic amendments
and statutes.195 For example, one of the biggest complaints about the Islamization programs involves the enactment of laws banning fornication,
which have a disparate impact on women. Evidence regarding the enforcement of these laws suggests that their impact on women, while still problematic, was less serious than sometimes assumed. Though there were a
312–13 (1988) [hereinafter Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan] (challenging the claims of these
other authors).
195. See, e.g., Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan, supra note 194, at 315–16 (“Despite widespread misgivings and conjecture both in Pakistan and the West that the execution of hadd penalties (amputations, stonings to death) would become commonplace in Pakistan, as of February
1988 no hadd penalty had been meted out in the state. Indeed, only two hadd convictions (both for
theft) had ever been upheld by the FSC. The Supreme Court later overturned both convictions.
Similarly, the implementation of the Hudood Ordinances has not had a significantly adverse impact on the status of women in Pakistan, as has been often alleged; nor has the implementation of
the law significantly altered the relationship between judicial and political institutions; nor has it
significantly changed judicial procedure in Pakistan.”); see also Charles Kennedy, Islamization
and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979–1989, 63 PAC. AFF. 62, 72–77 (1990) [hereinafter Kennedy,
Islamization and Legal Reform].

688

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:3

number of problematic convictions, judges in the higher judiciary seem systematically to have overturned these on appeal.196
Adding further complexity, Martin Lau has argued that whatever negative impact the statutes had on the liberal rule of law, they may have been
offset by the positive impact of court decisions in which judges used the
power of Islamic review to increase judicial power and to employ that
power in the service of liberal values.197
Lau’s work is based on an exhaustive survey of all published Pakistani
court cases from the 1960s to the present in which judges cite “Islamic law”
as a ground for decision. Lau identifies a trend that seems to have begun
shortly after Cornelius left the bench but before the rise of General Zia’s
praetorian Islamization program. According to Lau, judges increasingly
used Islamic arguments to justify opinions that boldly asserted the power of
judges to protect natural rights, notwithstanding military attempts to restrict
their powers. As judges struck down those statutes as un-Islamic or re-interpreted them to conform to a more liberal Islamic vision, they also continued
to expand the power of judges and the scope of fundamental rights in areas
not governed by Islamic statute. Lau’s conclusion is unequivocal:
The Islamisation of laws in Pakistan has been primarily a judgeled process, which was initiated to enhance the power of the judiciary and to expand the scope of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights. . . . [T]he role of judges in the Islamization of the
[Pakistani] legal system has been largely obscured by the more
visible manifestations of Islamisation, namely the promulgation
of the infamous Hudood Ordinances and other isolated pieces of
Islamic legislation . . . . [T]he judicial appropriation of Islam and
its integration into the vocabulary of courts was a conscious process aimed not only at the fulfillment of a general desire to indigenise and Islamise the legal system after the end of colonial
rule, but it was also a way of enhancing judicial power and independence. The Islamisation of law did, perhaps ironically, not
only predate Zia-ul-Haq’s regime, but was used to challenge
him. . . . [It] has become an integral part of the legal discourse
being relied on in the context of a wide range of issues, from the
permissibility to erect high rise buildings in Karachi to the dismissal of a Prime Minister.198
Cornelius, intriguingly, is barely mentioned in Lau’s study, which is
understandable in light of the limited scope of Lau’s book. As Lau explicitly notes in his book, the study is meant to be an exhaustive doctrinal legal
study analyzing the outcomes in Pakistani cases from the 1960s through the
1990s that refer to Islamic law. It was thus beyond the scope of his project
196. Kennedy, Islamization and Legal Reform, supra note 195, at 62, 65 n.9.
197. MARTIN LAU, THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF PAKISTAN 1–3 (2006).
198. Id. at 1.
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to explore why judges began to use Islam in the instrumentalist and progressive way that they did. From the information presented here, however, it
seems highly likely that the trend that Lau identifies was influenced by the
work of Cornelius.199
Lau’s study provides evidence to support Cornelius’s hypothesis that
the public would respect a liberal interpretation of Islamic law developed by
judges and that this could be used to empower the judiciary vis à vis the
executive. Indeed, it might protect natural rights not only from predatory
secular powers, but from illiberal and autocratic Islamic powers.
Although Lau’s work only covers cases through the early 2000s,
judges have continued to use liberal interpretations of Islamic law as a tool
to protect constitutional liberties. An examination of Pakistani newspapers
reveals that courts today continue to cite Islamic law to justify important
rights-protecting decisions.200 Notably, as illiberal Islamists have become
powerful in recent years, judges have been striking down self-styled “Islamic” laws that are based on illiberal interpretations of Islam.201 They do
so by arguing that such laws are inconsistent with Islamic justice, properly
understood.202
Pakistan is not the only country in which judicial application of Islamic legal principles has occasionally been used to protect natural rights
from both secular and religious enemies. My own research on Egyptian
199. Many of the judges Lau studied came of age during the period that Chief Justice Cornelius was arguing that the judiciary (and contemporary judges’ liberal vision of law) could best be
promoted by judge-led liberal Islamization. Without more research into the judges who pushed
this development, it is impossible to determine exactly how much Cornelius inspired their activity,
but he certainly must have played a role.
200. For example, the Federal Shariat Court (the FSC) recently issued a judgment on prisoners’ rights. The FSC handles crimes under “Islamic” criminal laws but also has jurisdiction to hear
challenges to laws on the grounds of their repugnancy. While AAJ News, somewhat mockingly,
focused on a provision suggesting that some prisoners be granted “conjugal rights,” the decision
actually orders broad changes to alleviate what it describes as inhuman treatment. See Married
Prisoners: FSC Calls for Giving Conjugal Rights, AAJ NEWS (Aug. 29, 2009), http://www.aajtv/
2009/08/married-prisoners-fsc-calls-for-giving-conjugal-rights/.
201. The FSC recently overturned article 154(4) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Law, which was an
Islamized version of the law of evidence. The FSC handles crimes under the “Islamic” criminal
laws governing, inter alia, rape or sexual harassment and has jurisdiction to hear challenges to
laws on the grounds of their repugnancy. The overturned article permitted men accused under the
“Islamic” criminal laws governing rape or sexual harassment to bring in evidence of the woman’s
character. Although the law was consistent with some widely held interpretations of Islam, the
FSC overturned the law on the ground that this interpretation relied on misinterpretations of the
Islamic tradition. See Shahadat Law Against Quran, Sunna: FSC, S. ASIA F. (Feb. 12, 2009),
http://www.south-asiaforum.org/2009/02/12/shahadat-law-against-quran-sunna/.
202. See id. The article notes, intriguingly, that the only government body that sent representatives to defend the sub-article in question was the government of the North West Frontier Province. This was a province under the control of a political party dominated by conservative
traditional Islamists. The article notes that “the Court observed that it had failed to comprehend
. . . what wisdom had prevailed upon lawmakers to add sub-article 4,” commenting that it served
no useful purpose and that, if one understood properly the broad moral principles announced in
the Qur’an, one would see that the sub-article in question contradicted them.
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constitutional court cases involving Islamic law also shows that in Egypt,
too, liberal judges have successfully used Islamic legal arguments to justify
a policy of expanding the scope of constitutional rights.203
Thus, the rise of popular piety and governmental programs to Islamize
society have undoubtedly led to illiberal treatment of people and human
rights abuses in Pakistan and Egypt.204 At the same time, however, liberal
judges in both countries have been able to develop Islamic arguments both
to forestall abuses by secular government and, more intriguingly, to resist
abuses carried out by citizens or government officials claiming to be acting
according to “Islamic” principles.
None of this proves conclusively that Cornelius was correct to hypothesize that liberalization ever requires Islamization. It is counterfactual
whether judicial empowerment and judicial liberalization would have taken
place in Pakistan and Egypt anyway, even if judges had not chosen to harness Islamic arguments in favor of their liberal vision. The evidence is,
however, suggestive. At the very least, the recent histories of Pakistan and
Egypt do not disprove Cornelius’s hypothesis that in some countries there is
a particular type of Islamization that is helpful—and indeed may be a necessary precondition—for the establishment of liberal democracy. It is thus
worth considering the ramifications of Cornelius’s hypothesis.
VI. CONCLUSION
We live in an age in which democracy and rule of law promotion are
not only objects of academic study205 but are also explicit foreign policy
goals of the United States, the European Union,206 and powerful multilateral institutions such as the World Bank.207 Billions of dollars are spent
every year with the explicit goal of promoting the rule of law, often defined
in thick terms as the practice of governance that provides people equal
treatment under a thickly liberal conception of law. A crucial question is
203. See generally LOMBARDI, supra note 4; Lombardi & Brown, supra note 4.
204. See the works discussed supra note 4.
205. For an early academic discussion of the emergence of Rule of Law promotion as a foreign policy objective in multiple countries, see, for example, Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law
Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95 (1998). For a discussion of U.S. efforts in the larger context of U.S.
programs to promote “Democracy,” see, for example, SUSAN B. EPSTEIN ET AL., DEMOCRACY
PROMOTION: A CORNERSTONE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf.
206. See, e.g., Patrı́cia Galvão Teles, Ministry of Foreign Aff. of Port., Rule of Law at the
National and International Levels, Statement on Behalf of the European Union, United Nations
62nd Session of the General Assembly, 6th Committee (Oct. 25, 2007), available at http://www.
europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_7569_en.htm.
207. See, e.g., David M. Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and Future, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 74, 74 (David M. Trubek &
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (“In the 1990s, there was a massive surge in development assistance for
law reform projects in developing and transition countries. These projects involve investments of
many billions of dollars. The World Bank alone reports it has supported 330 ‘rule of law’ projects
and spent $2.9 billion dollars on this sector since 1990.”).
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how such actors should promote the rule of law in countries where secular
actors have historically been illiberal and the alternative is some self-consciously Islamic form of governance.208 Should countries like the United
States promote liberal secularism—notwithstanding the fact that it was (because liberal) un-compelling to the illiberal elites and (because secular) uncompelling to a polity inclined to Islamism? Or should these countries instead promote Islamization while at the same time engaging in an active
project to have legal professionals promote an interpretation of Islam in
which judges would (a) have the final say in applying Islamic law and (b)
from the bench, promote a liberal interpretation of Islam? Cornelius argued
that in post-colonial Pakistan, the first approach was doomed to fail. Under
the circumstances, he thought, it would be very wise to try the second.
If Cornelius was correct, the United States and others involved in the
progress of building constitutionalism in the Muslim world should treat Islamization as a double-edged sword. Under some circumstances, Islamization should result in the application of laws repugnant to liberal
understandings of law. Under other circumstances, however, it should help
support the liberal rule of law. In a world that is struggling to understand
the implications of the global Islamic revival, scholars should be encouraged to to do whatever research is necessary to determine whether Cornelius’s intuition was correct. Until that research is done, we should admit
the provocative possibility that in some countries, under some circumstances, Islamization, or at least a certain type of Islamization, might be
something not simply to tolerate, but rather something to encourage and
facilitate.

208. See, e.g., JAN MICHIEL OTTO, SHARIA AND NATIONAL LAW IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES: TENOPPORTUNITIES FOR DUTCH AND EU FOREIGN POLICY 11–14 (2008).
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